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Essays on Corporate Cash holdings and Business groups
Yun Kyung Kim
This dissertation studies corporate cash holdings in Korea, with its own business groups
(“chaebols”), and the impact of Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998.
The first essay examines the effects of cash on performance from 1994 to 2006. It first
shows that cash-rich firms are more likely to survive and the exit rate of chaebol firms
with large cash holdings during the crisis is much smaller. Moreover, large cash holdings
in non-chaebol firms increase profitability compared to industry rivals after the crisis when
external capital becomes more costly. Efficiently allocated internal cash holdings in chaebols,
rather than affiliates’ own cash, are related to better performance in pre-crisis period. My
results suggest that business group affiliation is a key to explain the effect of cash on market
performance, and that the precautionary motive plays a central role.
The second essay studies the determinants of cash in Korean listed firms from 1993 to
2006. I find that the amount of cash in business groups is significantly smaller than that
in stand-alones. Chaebol firms with financial subsidiaries, which can provide alternative
financial resources, can reduce cash holdings. I also find that diversification contributes to
lower the level of cash in chaebols. Both sources became more important after the crisis.
The results also suggest that the smaller amount of cash in business groups is driven by a
smaller need for precautionary cash.
Table of Contents
List of Tables iii
List of Figures v
Acknowledgements vi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Business groups and the Effect of Cash on Performance: Evidence from
Korea 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Firm Survival and cash holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.3 Robustness check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Firm Performance and cash holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5.1 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
i
2.5.2 Univariate tests: non-Chaebols vs. Chaebols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.4 Robustness check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 The Determinants of Cash holdings: Evidence from Korean Business groups 48
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Empirical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5.1 Baseline estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5.2 Funds in Chaebol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5.3 Diversification in Chaebol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5.4 The Asian Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Bibliography 74
A Business groups in Korea 1993-2006 80
B Definitions of the main variables 83
ii
List of Tables
2.1 Descriptive statistics: Firm Survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 Effect of Cash on Firm Exit: Baseline estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Effect of Cash on Firm Exit with Chaebol affiliations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Effect of Cash on Firm Exit with the Asian Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Robustness check: Effect of Average Cash in Pre-Crisis on Firm Exit during
the Asian Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Descriptive statistics: Firm Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7 Univariate test: non-Chaebols vs. Chaebols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8 Effect of Cash on Firm Performance: Baseline estimation . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.9 Effect of Cash on Firm Performance with Chaebol affiliations . . . . . . . . . 41
2.10 Effect of Cash on Firm Performance with the Asian Financial Crisis . . . . 42
2.11 Effect of Internal Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance . . . . . . . . . 43
2.12 Effect of Internal Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance with the Asian
Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.13 Effect of Internal Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance with Allocation
of Internal capital market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.14 Robustness check: Effect of Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance . . . 46
3.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
iii
3.2 Univariate test: non-Chaebols vs. Chaebols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3 Baseline estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Funds in Chaebol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.5 Diversification in Chaebol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.6 After the Asian financial crisis I: Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.7 After the Asian financial crisis II: Diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A.1 Chaebols in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B.1 Definition of the variables in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
B.2 Definition of the variables in Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
iv
List of Figures
2.1 Average annual cash to total assets ratios for non-chaebol and chaebol firms 47
3.1 Average annual cash to total assets ratio of Korean listed firms . . . . . . . . 73
v
Acknowledgments
This dissertation would never have been completed without Professor Bernard Salanie´. He
has provided exceptional guidance, patience, support and time, all of which I needed to finish
this work. He has made every single step of the program I took possible. I am deeply grateful
to Professor Maria Guadalupe who shaped my thought and provided insightful comments.
I owe special thanks to Professor Chris Conlon for his valuable suggestions and feedback.
I wish to thank Professor Brenden O’flaherty and the Department for allowing me to have
this great opportunity. I am grateful to Professor David Wolfenzon for being a member of
dissertation committee and his generosity. I am indebted and grateful to Professor Kun-
Young Yun, my advisor in undergraduate, for encouraging me to pursue a PhD in economics
and to broaden my experience beyond campus.
I am blessed to be a part of my family. I thank my parents for their unconditional love and
prayers. They are always there for me with supports to find my own passion, courage, and
faith in God. I am grateful to my brother for his sincere prayers in the ups and downs of
the graduate program. I also thank my friends in Seoul and New York for their love and
support.







The literature on corporate cash holdings explains firms’ motives for cash reserves in the
following three ways: (1) it can reduce transaction costs incurred when other assets are
liquidated to make payments (Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966); (2) it can function as a
hedge against the future risks or adverse shocks on cash flows and investment opportunities
(Keynes, 1937). Firms need to hold cash to avoid default or maintain investment opportu-
nities as per the empirical evidence presented since Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998); (3)
multinational firms can retain earnings in the form of cash outside the home country instead
of incurring the tax effects of repatriating the earnings (Foley et al., 2007).
Recent financial crises have emphasized the importance of precautionary cash holdings
in a volatile financial market where firms were seen to increase the amount of cash held.
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) documents that the ratio of cash to total assets in U.S. firms
doubled from 1980 through 2006. This tendency was not limited to the U.S. only, in that
evidence for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004)
and for Asia (Song and Lee, 2012) have also shown elevated cash holdings. Lins, Servaes,
and Tufano (2010) and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) also support the idea of the
precautionary motive with their surveys on international and U.S. chief financial officers,
respectively.
There is a growing body of literature on the precautionary motive in cash holdings (Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello, 2007). This dissertation attempts to shed light on the relationship between cor-
porate cash holdings due to the precautionary motive, and business group affiliation. Firms’
financial positions and market outcomes vary with their organizational form. Thus, the
management of cash also depends on firm structure, so I expect cash policy and its effects
to be different in business groups than in stand-alone firms. Moreover, I explore whether
3the differences are related mainly to the precautionary motive. I investigate the precaution-
ary motive’s effect on firms’ market performance and on their level of cash, respectively.
I conduct a single-country analysis of Korea, which has significant business groups called
“chaebols” that experienced challenges during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.
The following second chapter examines the associations between a firm’s cash holdings,
its market performance, and its business group affiliation from 1994 to 2006. First, I provide
evidence that cash is essential for firm survival, using a duration model to reflect time
dependency. Irrespective of group affiliation, firms with large cash holdings are less likely to
exit from the industry. In addition, I discern that during a crisis, cash-rich firms, especially
chaebol firms have a much lower probability of exit when compared to other firms. The
results confirm the benefits from precautionary cash in costly external capital market.
I take one more step to examine the effect of cash on operating performances, measured
by the return on assets of a firm and that of its industry rivals. I apply the Dynamic Gen-
eralized Methods of Moments (GMM) that take first differences to remove the unobservable
firm heterogeneity and employ lagged values of regressors as instruments to solve endogeneity
problems. I show that non-chaebol firms with large cash holdings perform better than their
rivals in the post-crisis period. Cash in chaebol firms facing fewer financial constraints and
greater agency problems than non-chaebol firms is not value-increasing, but internal cash
held by other members and financial affiliates was effective and efficient for the performance
of affiliates only before the crisis. This means the management of cash, especially precau-
tionary cash, in operation depends on the condition of external capital market and firms’
organizational form.
The third chapter studies the determinants of cash holdings using a sample of listed
firms on Korean Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2006. I find that chaebol affiliation leads to
a lower level of cash. The study further reveals the difference in cash policy with two group
characteristics: group-wide funds and group-wide diversity. My results show that group cash
4and cash flow of other affiliates in the same business group do not have a significant effect,
while chaebols with financial affiliates can reduce the amount of cash holdings. Next, I test
co-insurance effect from diversified business groups. Imperfectly correlated investment op-
portunities or cash flows reduce the marginal value of cash in terms of precautionary demand.
I provide evidence for the negative effect of diversification on cash holdings with industry
and affiliate-level measures: the number of industries, Q-correlation across industries, and
CF-correlation across affiliates. Furthermore, I find that the extent of both group funds and
the diversification effect are strong in the constrained post-crisis corporate environment.
5Chapter 2
Business groups and the Effect of
Cash on Performance: Evidence from
Korea
62.1 Introduction
Does cash add value to firms? The literature finds that cash reserves serve the interests
of either the shareholders or the managers. Firms choose to hold cash to reduce the costs
of external financing; this substituting role played by cash increases firm value (Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007; Faulkender and
Wang, 2006). Cash is thus particularly beneficial during economic downturns, when external
capital is more costly (Harford, Mikkelson, and Partch, 2003; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009;
Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010). Firms can also hold cash to serve the managers’ own
interests at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986): empirical studies have found that
cash can be dissipated quickly in value-destroying projects (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008) or diverted to serve managers’ private benefits (Dittmar,
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; Kalcheva and Lins,
2007). This paper examines whether cash is beneficial to shareholders in terms of how its
operates with the organizational form to modify the member firms financial constraints and
agency problems in business groups.
Business groups, sets of firms with concentrated ownership led by a controlling share-
holder or family, are prevalent in Central Europe and Asia. Legally independent firms form
business groups with both formal and informal ties (La Porta et al., 2000; Khanna and
Palepu, 2000; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005, 2007). Af-
filiates, as members of a business group, have greater access to both internal and external
capital sources and hence, face fewer financial constraints. This leads a difference in cash
policy and studies on business groups in Europe and Asia also find that group firms hold
less cash than do stand-alones (Deloof, 2001; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Kim et al.,
2004), but the implications of this cash policy differential for the market have received little
attention.
7I perform a single-country study using Korean data to examine the cash-performance
relationship within organizational form. To consider Korea’s important business groups,
called “chaebols,” I obtain a list of affiliates to business groups from the Korean Fair Trade
Commissions. Thus, I can derive a clear definition of business groups and government
guidelines (Khanna, 2000). This single-country analysis also allows me to avoid endogeniety
problems encountered in cross-country analysis since each country’s business group structure
is highly correlated with the country’s own legal institutions and investor protection laws.
(La Porta et al., 2000; Joh, 2003).
My analysis proceeds in two steps using data for Korean firms between 1992 and 2006
period. Before I examine the relationship between cash and firm performance, I begin by
studying the effect of cash holdings on firm exits. I find that large-cash-holding firms are
less likely to exit, and this holds for both organizational forms: chaebols and non-chaebols.
The importance of cash holdings in firm operation is supported. This is consistent with
precautionary cash holdings by Keynes (1937). During a crisis, when both external and
internal capitals are constrained, the effect of cash on firm survival is much greater for
chaebol firms.
I then examine the impact of relative cash on operating performance. The estimation
method used in this study is carefully chosen to solve the econometric problems in fixed-
effects model. Firm fixed-effects correct omitted variable biases but concerns on unobservable
heterogeneity still remain. In addition, endogeneity problem in covariates leads estimates to
be inconsistent. To remove time-invariant firm heterogeneity and provide valid instruments
with lagged values, I employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This method is
especially appropriate to this study, which has a sample panel with a relatively short time
span in comparison to the number of firms and deals with a persistency of organizational
form.
I find that cash had a negative effect on performance before the crisis, and that cash
8did not add value to either chaebols or non-chaebol. The Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998
caused noteworthy changes in the Korean economy. I examine whether there is a modification
in the use of cash after this economy-wide shock. As financial constraints intensify, a firm’s
dependence on internal resources, especially cash, increases. The financial crisis tightens
the external capital independent of firm structure, and cash becomes a more crucial asset
than it was before the crisis. I demonstrate that cash-rich non-chaebol firms show better
performance (i.e., a higher return on assets) than their rivals in the industry, but this value-
enhancing effect of cash is limited to only stand-alone firms. For chaebol firms, cash holdings
still show a negative impact on return on assets.
To explain the value-destroying use of cash in chaebol firms, I examine the effect of
liquidity inside business groups on member firms’ performance. Liquidity inside business
groups can be perceived as a substitute for an affiliated firm’s own cash. There is a positive
relationship between group liquidity and profitability of affiliates but only before the crisis;
the Asian financial crisis attenuates the effect of internal liquidity. This result is consistent
with the findings in Lee, Park, and Shin (2009), which analyzes the operation of internal
capital market inside chaebols through reform and restructuring.
I extend the reach of prior studies in order to discover the differential effect in the benefits
of group liquidity across affiliates with the allocation of internal capital market. I find that
the effect of group liquidity on performance is greater in member firms with the highest total
sales before the crisis, meaning that the controlling shareholder is able to allocate group
resources to affiliates with good outcomes. This confirms the idea of an efficient internal
capital market that transfers group resources to winning firms (Stein, 1997). However, after
the crisis, member firms operating in industries with high growth potential rather than the
highest sales show a stronger improvement in performance by group liquidity.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on cash holdings in organiza-
tional forms, especially in diversified firms. Firms with multiple segments hold significantly
9less cash than do focused firms (Duchin, 2010; Subramaniam et al., 2011) because of the di-
versification of operations and the internal capital market. In addition, the value of cash for
diversified firms is less than for stand-alones (Tong, 2011). This study also provides insight
into the effect of cash holdings on the market. The persistent high cash firms perform better
than firms matched by size and industry (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003) and Fre´sard (2010)
shows that relatively large cash holdings produce a market share increase at the expense of
rivals.
In addition, this study contributes to the literature on business groups. Business groups
carry both costs and benefits. They are particularly beneficial in emerging and less-developed
financial markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat (2003) shows
that Korean business groups do not add value: they tend to stabilize profits, invest in low-
performing industries, and subsidize weaker group members. My finding supports this view,
given my results on the relationship between cash and performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 examine the effect of cash on firms exit and
operating performance. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Hypotheses
A high level of cash holdings in financially constrained firms is a competitive advantage
allowing the pursuit of valuable investments, leading to better market performance. The
role and use of cash differs according to the organizational form, because business groups
have few financial constraints and severe agency problems. First, business groups are less
financially constrained than are stand-alone firms for various reasons. Their firm size and
consequent debt capacity tends to be large. As Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) and Kim
et al. (2004) show, group firms enjoy a more favorable relationship with external capital
10
market through a group reputation and loan guarantees from other affiliates. Moreover,
affiliated firms in the same business group share financial and non-financial resources by
forming an internal capital market such as internal debt, intra-relations and other various
types. An additional source of capital, internal capital can be used as a substitute for a
firm’s own or external capital (Stein, 1997; Shin and Park, 1999).
In addition, the agency problem affects the use of cash, as entrenched managers may
divert cash to increase their own wealth. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) finds that poor
corporate governance is associated with lower firm value, as the dissipation of cash reduces
operating performance. Business groups suffer from an agency problem when the controlling
shareholder extracts from the minority shareholders. Korean chaebols have been criticized
for having a controlling shareholder who, despite holding a small share of the groups equity,
rules all affiliates. I predict the agency problem inside chaebols would dominate the cash
management of member firms as well as firm operations. Thus, I expect the value-enhancing
effect of cash on the market to apply mainly to non-chaebol firms.
(H1) The beneficial effect of large cash holdings on firm performance is lim-
ited to non-chaebol firms.
Korea experienced a massive macroeconomic shock, the Asian financial crisis, in 1997 and
1998, which increased external financing costs and set up a natural experiment to examine
cash’s effect on firm performance in the context of financial constraints. Almeida, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004) finds that financially constrained firms hold significantly large cash
and that the value of the cash is higher than that of unconstrained firms (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). In order to continue investing, firms tend to depend
on cash more than they did before the crisis. Moreover, Luo (2011) shows that financial
constraints play a disciplinary role in the use of cash holdings in that the dissipation of cash
by entrenched managers in financially constrained firms brings higher profitability.
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After the crisis, both chaebol and non-chaebol firms faced greater financial constraints,
such as banks tightened loan guidelines. The government initiated reforms and restructuring
of firms, particularly for chaebol firms; debt ratios were limited to 200% and cross-loan
guarantees in business groups were prohibited. I explore whether the use of cash became
more favorable to performance of all firms in the post-crisis period, when firms are financially
constrained than before.
(H2) After the Asian financial crisis, the effect of cash on firm performance
became greater than it had been in the pre-crisis period.
As mentioned, the internal capital market is an additional source of financial strength for
business groups. This internal capital market, such as liquid assets held by other members
and financial affiliates, puts chaebol firms in a relatively cash-rich position. I expect that
group liquidity substitutes for the role of a firm’s own cash.
Furthermore, the effect of group liquidity on members’ performance depends on the
controlling shareholder’s allocation decision, because resources inside business groups are
not equally distributed across affiliates. If this reallocation is efficiently managed by well-
informed but self-serving controlling shareholders, group resources are transferred from firms
with poor prospects to those with good prospects, enhancing the value of the group (Stein,
1997). Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argues the opposite, finding that internal capital market
operates to subsidize members with poor performance. Thus, if controlling shareholder
efficiently transfers resources inside a group, I expect group liquidity to be beneficial to
high-performing affiliates:
(H3) Liquidity in business group substitutes for affiliated firms’ cash holdings,
and the effect is greater for members with good prospects than others if internal
capital market is efficient.
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I combine the above hypotheses into the following table. This table summarizes the predic-
tions of the hypotheses. A plus (minus) sign indicates a positive (negative) impact of cash
holdings on firm performance. A question mark indicates no decisive relation.





I use the annual financial data for all available firms whose total assets were more than
seven billion Korean won at least once between 1992 and 2006 as recorded by the Korean
Investors Service. In examining the impact of cash policy on chaebol and non-chaebol firms,
the identification of business groups is based on the yearly report of the Korea Fair Trade
Committee (KFTC). The Korean government concerns itself deeply with business groups
and releases annual statements about chaebols with detailed ownership information every
April; changes in affiliates are also reported monthly.
The KFTC defines a chaebol as a set of firms controlled directly or indirectly by the
controlling shareholder and meets two criteria: 1) it is a group of companies where more
than 30% of the shares are owned by individuals or companies and, 2) there exists a cutoff for
the total value of group affiliates. Only the thirty largest groups were included in chaebols up
to 2000. Since 2001, however, any group above the combined total assets cutoff is included.
Hence, the number of chaebols increased to 52 by 2006, the final year of the sample. I
exclude financial and utility firms from the sample, following the literature. I also ignore
firm-years for which data on total assets, cash holdings, and sales are not available and those
13
with an asset growth higher than 200%. In defining the industry, I eliminate all firm-year
observations lacking an industry code based on the three-digit Korean Standard Industrial
Classification (KSIC), the Korean form of the SIC.
For this dataset, I use the following data selection criteria. To study firm survival, I adjust
the sample cutoff for total assets with the yearly GDP growth rate to balance the number of
firms across the years. For the firm performance study, which uses industry-adjusted data, I
include all firms and require that each industry comprise more than ten firms. In addition,
I restrict the sample to firms have at least four consecutive years to run the dynamic GMM
estimation; hence, the sample starts in 1994.
2.4 Firm Survival and cash holding
2.4.1 Model
I first examine the effect of a firm’s cash on exit from the market in this section before
examining the relationship between a relative cash and firm performance. Cash on hand can
be quickly used for any purpose and is especially important for firms at the risk of default.
I classify the firms that remain in the sample from the beginning of a year to the beginning
of the next year as ‘survivors’ for that year; ‘exiting firms’ are those that leave the sample
during the year by closing. The dependent variable is set to 1 if the firm exits and zero
otherwise.
To measure firms’ liquidity, I define cash as the ratio of the sum of cash, cash equiva-
lents, and short-term financial instruments, to total assets. Cash can be physical currency
in domestic and foreign notes, currency equivalents, and demand deposits that can be with-
drawn at any time, such as checking accounts. Cash equivalents are instruments such as U.S.
government Treasury bills and bank certificates of deposit that can be converted into cash
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immediately. Also included in cash equivalents are financial instruments and marketable
securities whose expiration dates are in less than three months. Short-term instruments
are products and services of financial institutions used for short-term financial management
that are due within one year. Examples are time deposits, certificates of deposit, commercial
paper, and cash management accounts. Further, this measure separates the effect of cash
from that of other short-term capital management such as lines of credit, inventory, or net
working capital.
Motivated by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), who develop a theory of borrowing con-
straints and study its implications for firm survival and similar to Spaliara and Tsoukas
(2010)’s empirical model, I include size, profits, total leverage, and tangible assets in the
model:
Pr(Exiti,t = 1) = F (β1Cashi,t−1 + β2Total Leveragei,t−1 + β3Profitabilityi,t−1
+ β4Collaterali,t−1 + β5Sizei,t−1 + β6Agei,t−1
+ β7Exchangei,t−1 + β8MESj,t−1 + i,t) (2.1)
Large firms tend to face lower barriers in capital markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Firm
age is related to size, which is defined as a log of total assets; mature firms tend to survive
longer than do start-up firms. Profitability is defined as the ratio of operating income before
depreciation and amortization expenses to total assets. Collateral is tangible assets. Firms
unable to generate internal funds and pledge collateral with tangible assets are more likely
to fail. Total Leverage is measured as total debt divided by total assets and implies that
highly indebted firms are also at risk of bankruptcy.
I also include the exchange rate to estimate firm survival, because it is central to inter-
national competitiveness and export strength. Baggs, Beaulieu, and Fung (2009) finds that
currency appreciation lowers survival rates in Canada because foreign firms enjoy a cost ad-
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vantage over the domestic currency. The evidence from East Asian countries shows that the
real appreciation of the early 1990s weakened financial structures and triggered the subse-
quent financial crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 2000). I use minimum efficient scale (MES), the log
of median total sales, for the industry to reflect industry conditions. Industries with a large
MES tend to have high price-cost margins, which is positively associated with firm survival.
However, start-ups in industries with large minimum efficient scales are less likely to survive
(Audretsch, 1991; Mata and Portugal, 1994). Industry fixed effects are also included in the
estimation.
Firm exit is a binary outcome; this type of data is estimated by Logit model in the
literature. However, traditional Logit model does not take account of time dependency so
the probability of survival at any point in time is always the same. In the presence of time
dependency, the estimates are inefficient and the standard errors may be underestimated by
50% or more (Beck and Katz, 1997). Thus, I employ the discrete duration model introduced
in Jenkins (1995).
Let T denote a discrete random variable indicating the time of an exit. Firm exits are
observed at discretely defined points in time, t.
f(t) = Pr(T = t) (2.2)
The hazard rate is the risk of an exit, equivalent to the ratio of the probability of failure to
the probability of survival. This ratio can be expressed as the conditional probability of exit




= Pr(T = ti|T ≥ ti) (2.3)
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Thus, the probability of exit at ti is
f(ti) = Pr(T = ti)
= Pr(T = ti|T ≥ ti)× Pr(T > ti−1|T ≥ ti−1)× · · · × Pr(T > t1|T ≥ t1)





The survival function can be written as





giving that the probability of surviving beyond ti is equal to the conditional probability of
surviving through each of the t previous periods.


















In this paper, I replace the duration in the model with firm ages since durations can be
calculated by the difference between firm age and the beginning of sample year (here, 1994).
2.4.2 Results
Table 2.1 presents the univariate test for the exit and non-exit firms, with the statistical
differences in panel A. Exit firms tend to be significantly smaller, less mature, and financially
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weaker in terms of leverage, profits, and tangibles than the remaining firms, as expected.
The BG liquidity measure is also larger in surviving firms. Panel B shows the contrast
between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Chaebol firms are larger, more mature, and have
higher profits. However, the small tangible assets and high total leverage ratio of chaebol
firms indicate a favorable external market from the group reputation effect and cross-loan
guarantees.
Table 2.2 reports the results of the baseline estimation. Column (1), without firm cash,
shows that all the control signs are as predicted in the earlier section. I introduce the cash
ratio in the estimation in columns (2) and (3). The coefficients of cash (-2.742 and -2.651)
are negative and statistically significant at 1% in both regressions, implying that a cash-
rich firm is more likely to survive in the market after controlling other variables. Predicted
probability of exit at mean of all independent variables in the baseline model is 1.3%, close
to the probability of exit in Table 2.1. The economic magnitude of cash ratio is interpreted
with the averaged marginal effect in column (4) that means one percent increase in cash
brings a reduction of 0.035 percentage point in the predicted probability of exit from the
market. In addition, there is a time dependency on firm exit from the results regarding age
duration dummy variables. Younger firms are more likely to exit compared to more matured
firms.
Now, I include two main considerations of this paper in estimations, chaebol affiliation
and the Asian Financial Crisis. First, Table 2.3 examines whether the impact of cash holdings
on firm survival depends on the organizational form (business groups). I classify firms BG
as chaebol affiliates if they are listed in the annual reports by the KFTC. The coefficient of
both chaebol firms (-2.110, significant at 10%) in column (1) and non-chaebol firms (-2.520,
significant at 1%) in column (2) are negative. In pooled regression (column (3)), the positive
but not significant coefficient of the interaction term between Cash and BG confirms the
results of the separate regressions. Firms with a high cash-to-asset ratio are more likely to
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survive regardless of business group affiliation since the result does not provide evidence of
the differential effect from firm structure.
I extend the regression by considering the Asian financial crisis. As Keynes (1937) ex-
plains concerning the precautionary motive of cash holdings, cash-rich firms are more likely
to survive adverse shocks. I examine the relationship between firm exit probability and cash
for all firms in column (1) of Table 2.4. I introduce an interaction term between firm cash
and the crisis dummy (AFC) set to 1 in the period from 1997 to 1998 and zero otherwise.
The coefficients of the crisis are undoubtedly positive, in that firms face a higher probability
of exit during the crisis. Switching to a period of crisis after several tranquil years increases
the likelihood of exit by 1.9 percentage point on average (column (2)). For example, at the
mean of the other controls, the predicted probability of exit during the crisis is 2.85% com-
pared to 1.12%. The interaction term (-1.654, significant at 10%) shows a significantly large
reduction in the probability of an exit from the cash holdings. Cash is especially powerful
during the crisis.
I repeat the tests for chaebol firms (in column (3)) and for non-chaebol firms (in column
(4)). Cash-rich firms are able to sustain themselves during adverse market shocks regardless
of their firm structure. In addition, the effect is much stronger for chaebol firms; those
with large cash holdings are more likely to survive through the crisis (-10.29, significant at
5%). Each affiliate operates as an independent firm, whose managers first try to cope with
a crisis within their own firm. The benefits of affiliation, such as internal supports and good
relationships with banks, are not effective during crises. Hence, their dependence on their
own cash increases and the effect of cash on firm exit is greater in the crisis period.
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2.4.3 Robustness check
A firm’s cash policy may be endogenously related to the business environment, especially
to a financial crisis. An amplified positive relationship between cash holdings and firm
survival during the financial crisis might have arisen from either a bankruptcy risk or lost
investment opportunities. I address this endogeneity issue by examining previous levels of
cash holdings before the crisis. I define Pre Cash as an averaged cash ratio in the pre-crisis
period (1994–1996) and examine the effect of cash holdings on firm survival during the crisis
period (1997–1998) for the robustness on my findings. Table 2.5 reports the results. In
column (1), I still find that highly levered, low-profit, small firms with fewer tangible assets
were more likely to exit. Moreover, the coefficient of Pre Cash (-3.477) is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level, which means firms with large cash holdings before
the crisis were less likely to exit during the crisis. This again confirms the precautionary
demand on cash holdings as shown in the results of Table 2.4. I consider the effect of group
affiliation with the interaction term between Pre Cash and the BG dummy in column (2).
The greater positive effect of cash on firm survival probability in chaebol firms is also robust.
2.5 Firm Performance and cash holding
2.5.1 Model
This section examines whether holding more cash than industry rivals adds value to firm
performance, the main interest of this paper. Following Campello (2003) and Fre´sard (2010),
I specify the baseline model as follows:
Performancei,t = β0Performancei,t−1 + β1Cashi,t−1 + γ
′
Xi,t−1 + ωi + νt + i,t (2.7)
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where the dependent variable Performance is ROA, the return on total assets minus the
industry-year average. This variable measures a firm’s performance compared to that of its
rivals. Cashi,t−1 is the sum of cash and cash equivalents and short-term financial instruments
divided by total assets of firm i at time t− 1 less the industry-mean. To consider each firm’s
initial performance level, the lagged ROA is in the equation. Xi,t−1 is the matrix of the control
variables, which are lagged one year and adjusted by the mean of the industry. Firm size,
leverage, investment, and cash flow as control variables to capture other sources of market
performance are included. Size is the log of total assets. Leverage is defined as the sum of
long term debt and current position of long term debt divided by total assets. Investment
is measured with capital expenditure scaled by total assets. Cash flow is operating income
plus depreciation scaled by total assets.
Finally, I include ωi for the time-invariant firm effects, νt for aggregate shocks to all firms
and i,t for random disturbances. To examine the difference by the affiliation to business
groups, I extend the baseline model with business group liquidity.
Performancei,t = β0Performancei,t−1 + β1Cashi,t−1 + γ
′
Xi,t−1+
+ δBG Liquidityi,t−1 +BGi,t−1 + ωi + νt + i,t (2.8)
For business group liquidity variables, I include two measures. First, BG Cash measures
the cash holdings of the firms affiliates in the same business group. This direct measure is
defined as the log of total cash in all affiliates except the firm under consideration. The other
variable is the number of financial affiliates inside chaebols (Fin Affiliates).
There are two empirical challenges to obtaining more precise and consistent estimates
for effects of cash holdings: unobservable firm heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity of
the regressors.
The literature uses a fixed-effect model to correct for the omitted variables bias: unob-
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servable heterogeneity might be correlated with regressors. This is why I include individual
dummies, here ωi. However, fixed effects models provide inconsistent estimates when time
span is small (Nickell, 1981), and it may not completely control heterogeneity. Furthermore,
the persistency of business group affiliation requires another form of regression (Zhou, 2001;
Coles, Lemmon, and Felix Meschke, 2012) since firm fixed effects regressions cannot capture
the time variations of exogenous factors nor include the cross-sectional differences across
firms.
The Dynamic General Method of Moments developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
allows me to solve the heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. First, I take the first difference
to remove the firm heterogeneity controlled by the firm-specific effect ωi in the baseline model
(2.7).
∆Performancei,t = α(∆Performancei,t−1) + β(∆Cashi,t−1) + γ
′
(∆Xi,t−1)
+ ∆νt + ∆i,t (2.9)
Then, to solve possible endogeneity between ∆Cashi,t−1 and ∆i,t, I exploit orthogonality
conditions between the lagged values of variables and the random disturbance. Instead of
exogenous instruments, I use instruments for the cash ratio and business group affiliation
variables lagged from t-2 to t-4 as instruments for the equations in differences and t-2 for
the equations in levels following the assumption in Blundell and Bond (2000); Bond (2002).
E(ωi) = E(it) = E(ωiit) = 0
E(isit) = 0, s 6= t
E(Cashi1it) = 0, t = 2, . . . , T
E(∆Cashit−1it) = 0, t = 3, . . . , T (2.10)
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These assumptions show that there is no correlation between instruments and the error term
and consequently, the validity of instruments. To check the assumption of no second order
serial correlation in the first difference residual, I show each model’s AR(2) statistic from
the Arellano and Bond test in the result tables. The system GMM is estimated using the
xtdpdsys command in Stata.
2.5.2 Univariate tests: non-Chaebols vs. Chaebols
I first provide the descriptive statistics of the variables in Table 2.6. To investigate the
differences between chaebol and non-chaebol firms in Korea, I test the differences in the
means and medians of the variables. Table 2.7 presents the results of these univariate tests.
I report the statistics separately for the periods before (Panel A), during (Panel B) and after
(Panel C) the crisis.
As shown in the table, chaebol firms (with a mean of around 19) are significantly larger
than non-chaebol firms are (with a mean of around 16) for all periods. In the pre-crisis
period, the mean and median of the cash to asset ratio of chaebol firms are 5.8% and 3.9%
of total assets, respectively, while the mean and median are 9.8% and 7.2%, respectively for
non-chaebol firms. After the crisis period, both the mean (11.1% of total assets) and median
(6.0% of total assets) cash ratio of chaebol firms continue to be smaller and are statistically
different from the mean (12.4% of total assets) and median (7.7%) of non-chaebol firms.
However, the cash ratio increase of the chaebols is much larger between periods than that of
non-chaebols, and the difference between the two classes becomes smaller in later years.
Investment is defined as capital expenditure divided by total assets. In the pre- and crisis
periods, investment is higher for chaebol firms (with means of 6% and 5%) than for non-
chaebol firms (with means of 4.1% and 2.1%). The ratio of long-term debt to total assets is
slightly higher for chaebol firms (with means of 15.1% and 15.6%) than for non-chaebol firms
23
(with means of 13.9% and 15.2%) in the pre- and crisis periods. After the crisis, however,
we observe the opposite pattern for leverage and investment: the non-chaebol firms invest
more (2.2%) and are indebted more (10.7%) in means than are chaebol firms (with means
of -1.8% and 8.2%). This pattern is driven mainly by a post-crisis plunge of the ratios of
chaebols. This is consistent with banks charging higher loan rates to chaebol firms as well
as non-chaebol firms during the crisis and post-crisis periods (Kim et al., 2004) and chaebol
firms showing a reduced bank loan-to-debt ratio (Song and Lee, 2012).
A firm’s cash flow is defined as its operating income plus depreciation divided by total
assets. Chaebol firms’ mean cash flow is smaller than that of the non-chaebol firms in the
pre-crisis and crisis periods. In the post-crisis period, though, chaebol firms’ cash flow (with
a mean of 8.1%) is greater than that of the non-chaebol firms (with a mean of 7.3%), perhaps
partly due to the somewhat depressed capital investment activities of chaebol firms during
that period, as documented above.
Business group liquidity variables change across periods, as do firm-level variables. BG
Cash increases over the periods as individual affiliates increase their own cash. Interestingly,
the number of financial affiliates (Fin Affiliates) increases (with a mean of 4), but many firms
failed during and after the crisis, causing a situation similar to that of the pre-crisis period.




This subsection provides the results of the regressions testing the impact of cash holdings
on firm performance. To measure firm performance, I use the return on assets (ROA) as
EBITDA/Total Assets. Table 2.8 presents the basic estimation along with the specification
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methods.
In columns (1) and (2), I show the results of the OLS and firm fixed effects regression,
respectively. Both estimated coefficients on the lagged cash ratio (0.01 and 0.003) are pos-
itive. Firms with large cash holdings show a better operating performance than do other
firms in the same industry. Of the other explanatory variables, leverage is significant while
other variables (including size, cash flow, and investments) are insignificant. I also control
for the historic values of firm performance, since firm performance depends on time trends,
and these coefficients are large and significant in both estimations (0.626 and 0.313).
To avoid biased and inconsistent estimators, I use the system GMM estimation in columns
(3) to (5) with different lags (lags 2, 3, and 7). The main coefficient of interest on the cash-
to-asset ratio is positive. Cash-rich firms show a higher return on assets than their industry
rivals do, but the coefficients are not significant. The previous level of ROA explains almost
50% of current ROA, and size is negatively correlated to firm performance, as expected.
Investment, leverage, and cash flow increase the relative ROA. Leverage and investment
are statistically significant. Assumptions on no second order correlation cannot be rejected
for all specifications by their AR(2) statistics. The main challenge for system GMM is to
choose the appropriate numbers of instruments. Adding more instruments with increasing
lag lengths does not change the results, and hence, I use up to lag 3 as instruments for the
subsequent estimations.
Business group (Chaebol) affiliation
Cash can be helpful to make profits directly as investments in production and indirectly as
expenditures on selling related projects. Chaebol firms are different from non-chaebol firms
in financing conditions, incentives of managers, and subsequent usage of cash. The results
of the baseline estimation analyzing the effect of cash on firm performance vary according
to organizational form. Cash in a business group is not dissipated in the same way as it
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is in stand-alone firms. Because of characteristics of business groups as partly shown with
the different effect of cash on firm survival from the previous section. Chaebols have more
ability to manage their capital because of easier access to the external capital markets, given
their group reputation and cross-loan guarantees. They also can usually tap their internal
capital market.
To take account of chaebol affiliation in the relationship between cash holdings and return
on assets, I include the interaction term between cash ratio and the business group affiliation
dummy (BG dummy), which equals one for chaebol firms and zero otherwise. I also separate
subsamples with chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms.
I rank the chaebols by total assets: 1) all chaebols (BG dummy); 2) the thirty largest
(BG30 dummy); 3) the five largest (BG5 dummy). The regression results for business groups
are shown in Table 2.9. I first show the results of separate regressions by firm structure in
columns (1) to (4). Columns (5) to (6) present the results of the pooled regression. The sign
and significance of the interaction between Cash and BG dummy strongly support the view
that cash has a negative impact on firm profitability and confirm the results of the separated
regressions.
The cash ratio for non-chaebols in column (4) is positive (0.023) and significant at the
10% level while that for all chaebols is no longer positive and significant at the 5% level
in columns (1) to (3). These results show that cash is value destroying for chaebol firms.
As also seen in column (5) for pooled regression, the positive effect of cash (0.023) on
return on assets for non-chaebol firms becomes negative for chaebol firms (-0.05). Assessing
the economic significance of the result, I see a one-standard-deviation increase (decline) in
industry-adjusted lagged cash in non-chaebol (chaebol) firms increases industry-adjusted
ROA by 3.1% (6.2%) of the mean cash holdings. Column (6), comprising only the thirty
largest business groups, presents a similar result.
Substantially lower effect of cash provides evidence of an agency problem between con-
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trolling and minority shareholders in chaebols. This is consistent with the idea of value-
destroying operation of business groups Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat (2003); Morck,
Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005); Khanna and Yafeh (2007). Studies including Joh (2003);
Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007) note that controlling shareholders in Korean chaebols dominate
affiliates with relatively very few shares and provide empirical evidence. Manager’s interests
are usually in line with those of the controlling shareholders in Korean chaebol because they
appoint the managers, who are usually family or people who have built close relationships
for years.
I extend the business group regression in column (1) by including a five-largest group
dummy and its interaction with the cash ratio in column (2). Interestingly, I find a positive
effect of cash on ROA (0.028) for these large chaebols, although with a large cash decrease
in other chaebol firms (-0.135). In these groups, such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai Motors,
outside monitoring is more strict, and ownership is more dispersed than for other chaebols.
The other explanation with business group liquidity is tested in a later subsection.
The Asian Financial Crisis
As Figure 12.1 indicates, both chaebol and non-chaebol firms increase their cash holdings
after a crisis. I examine whether this change is meaningful for firm performance or caused by
a lack of investment opportunities during economic downturns. This model differs from the
previous one in that I include an explanatory Asian Financial Crisis dummy (AFC), which
takes a value of one for observations from 1997 to 1998 and zero otherwise. The post-crisis
dummy (Post) is one from 1999 to 2006 and zero, otherwise. The results are shown in Panel
A of Table 2.10.
For all firms in column (1), the results show that cash is significantly beneficial to firm
performance after the crisis. In the pre-crisis period, large reserved cash holdings are neg-
atively related to ROA, but the effect becomes considerably positive during the post-crisis
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period (0.12).
To investigate whether two classes of firms have different effects, I show business group
affiliates in columns (2) to (3) and stand-alones in column (4). Large cash holdings do not
add value before the crisis for both classes, and the absolute value of the coefficient for
chaebols is -0.15, more than three times that for non-chaebols. During and after the crisis,
cash is still negatively associated with the chaebol firms’ performance although the degree
becomes smaller. Firms in Korea are more financially constrained because banks do not
increase credit lines and try to collect on loans in the crisis period. This increase is also
caused by new regulation and restructuring following the crisis. The Korean government
requires firms to reduce their debt to equity ratio by up to 200% and has banned cross-loan
guarantees to regulate chaebols’ financial soundness. Chaebols cannot depend on banks as
much as they did before, confirming the decreased leverage ratio in the descriptive statistics
after a crisis (Kim et al., 2004). However, to the extent that the use of cash for chaebol
firms is still driven by the agency problem of the earlier section, it is value reducing for
firms. In contrast, non-chaebol firms enjoy the benefits of high cash holdings in a financially
constrained market after the crisis. For a one-standard-deviation increase in lagged cash, the
standard deviation of ROA decreases by 0.4% in the pre-crisis period. On the other hand,
the coefficient of lagged cash equals 0.2, such that one standard deviation increase in cash
is associated with a 0.3% lower ROA, 3.1% of ROA in average non-chaebol firm.
For robustness, I re-estimate the relationship between cash holdings and the Asian finan-
cial crisis using different time frames. The crisis, resultant regulations, and restructuring
persisted until 2000. Thus, 2000 may be the most appropriate cut-off by which to define the
post-crisis period. I redefine the crisis as the period between 1997 and 2000 (AFC00) and the
post-crisis period (Post00) as the years after 2001 in order to separate the differences across
periods in Panel A. Panel B shows the results: the effect of cash again becomes greater after
the crisis. This confirms the robustness of my findings.
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Cash inside Chaebols: Internal capital market
The evidence in the previous section shows that cash does not increase firm performance
for business groups as it does for non-chaebol firms (Table 2.9). In this subsection, I ex-
amine how internal financing inside chaebols, their internal capital market, may affect firm
performance as a substitute for the firm’s own liquidity. I introduce two measures: one is
the log of other affiliates’ cash (BG Cash), and the other is the number of financial affiliated
firms (Fin Affiliates). The estimated results are provided in Table 2.11, with Panel A rep-
resenting all business groups and Panel B the thirty largest groups. The effect of BG Cash,
directly measuring the group liquidity, is close to zero and insignificant for the performance
in chaebol firms. In addition, I cannot find a significant increase in the return on assets
from Fin Affiliates. The benefits of the cash held by other affiliates or financial affiliates are
thus not clear. I further test whether the Asian financial crisis triggered a change in the role
of internal capital markets in firm performance, as it had changed the effect of firms’ cash
holdings.
I again identify periods with dummy variables: a pre-crisis dummy for the 1992 to 1996
period, and a post-crisis one for the 1999 to 2006 period. The results are presented in Table
2.12. In the pre-crisis period, the coefficients for both group liquidity measures are positive
and statistically significant. The coefficient of BG Cash (0.001) in column (4) is economically
significant before the crisis, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in cash in other
affiliates leads to an increase in ROA by 0.4%. However, the effect becomes statistically
insignificant and trivial in the post-crisis period. Column (8) regarding financial affiliates
shows similar results. Chaebol firms take advantage of their internal capital markets for the
sake of firm performance. However, the interaction variable between group liquidity and the
post-crisis dummy shows a negative association, and the effect of liquidity after the crisis
becomes close to zero. This indicates that group liquidity does not operate as much as it had
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before the crisis. Thus, the data support the literature’s assertions about Korea’s internal
capital market. Lee, Park, and Shin (2009) show that the positive investment sensitivity of
affiliates cash flow before the crisis did not hold after the crisis, and they call this tendency
the disappearance of the internal capital market.
Allocation in Internal Capital Market
I then extend my empirical demonstration that the business group liquidity contributes to an
increased relative firm performance in the pre-crisis period by considering the reallocation
of liquid assets inside the group. The internal capital market literature offers conflicting
views on how business groups allocate internal resources across affiliates. Stein (1997) argues
that well-informed headquarters, unlike outside banks suffering from information asymmetry,
transfer inner resources in support of the better-performing divisions in diversified firms.
In contrast, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that the agency problem across division
managers leads to the misallocation of resources in the form of subsidizing poorly performing
divisions.
This subsection identifies whether affiliates enjoy the benefits of internal liquidity inside
business groups. If the controlling shareholders allocate resources efficiently, the effect of
internal liquid resources on firms with the highest sales will be greater than for other member
firms. I define a dummy variable for Max Sales to take the value of one if a firm has the
highest total sales in its chaebol group and zero otherwise. Panel A of Table 2.13 presents
the results. I separate the field into the periods before and after the 1997-1998 crisis, as
previous results have shown how the internal capital market operates efficiently before the
crisis.
First, as shown in column (1), the positive effect (0.004+0.002=0.006) of BG Cash, cash
in other affiliates, is greater for affiliates with the highest total sales inside chaebols than for
other affiliates (0.004) during the pre-crisis period. This result also holds for Fin Affiliates,
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the number of financial affiliates inside the chaebols. Column (2) shows that the coefficient
of Fin.Affiliates for the better performing affiliate is 0.057 and 0.002 for other affiliates. The
effects of both group liquidity variables are positive, but they are not significant during and
after the crisis (columns (3) to (4)). The estimated coefficients thus point to the efficient
allocation of group liquidity, but the crisis hinders the efficient operation of internal capital
markets.
I also investigate the relationship between growth potential of industries and the alloca-
tion of group liquidity. Tobin’s Q, a proxy for investment opportunity used in the literature,
is defined as the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity over
assets. I thus construct a median Tobin’s Q for each industry with non-chaebol listed firms
to examine the industry’s investment potential. I then define a dummy variable, Med Qnon,
which takes the value of one for the industry in the above median within its chaebol and zero
otherwise. The regression results using Med Qnon are reported in panel B of Table 2.13.
The coefficient for the interaction of Med Qnon with both chaebol cash variables changes
its sign from negative to positive throughout the crisis, indicating that the effect of group
liquidity on performance is strong for the firms operating in the industries with low growth
potential before the crisis (columns (5) to (6)). On the other hand, in the period of 1997-
2006, member firms in the high growth potential industries are more strongly supported by
group liquidity. For example, the coefficients in column (5) suggest that if a chaebol firm
operating in industries with relatively high growth potential experiences a one standard de-
viation increase in cash among its other member firms, it raises its ROA by 0.1 percent point
(0.001*1.353) compared to 0.9 percent point (0.007*1.353) when operating in industries with
low growth potential. However, members operating in industries with high growth potential
receive more benefits during and after the crisis. The economic magnitude is significant. A
one standard deviation increase in group cash for firms in industries of higher investment
opportunities leads to an increase of 0.15 standard deviation of ROA whereas firms in lower
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growth potential industries experience only a 0.04 standard deviation of ROA. This is in
line with recent anecdotes about business group management strategy that chaebols expand
and over-invest in highly profitable markets without establishing their priority operations or
considering the survivability of small enterprises.
2.5.4 Robustness check
This section presents additional evidence on the robustness of my findings. One concern
with the estimation might be that the relative performance depends on firm survival. A firm
at risk of failure would show continually poor returns on assets compared to its industry
rivals, and the beneficial effect of cash would be underestimated. Although the dependent
variable, ROA, is adjusted by the industry mean in the main results, I restrict the sample to
firms that have existed for at least 15 years to avoids the biases from firm failures. This new
sample of 18231 firm-years includes 110 chaebols and 450 non-chaebols. Table 2.14 presents
the results; my findings remain the same. The results in Panel A confirm that the effect
of cash holdings on firm performance depends on the organizational form and the crisis, as
shown in Table 2.10 and 2.11. The group liquidity variables shown in Table 2.12 are also
robust, as shown by the results in Panel B.
2.6 Conclusion
My answer whether cash is really effective in the Korean market is nuanced. The effect
depends on the organizational form, and in particular whether the firm belongs to a business
group; and it changed after the Asian financial crisis.
Cash is an important determinant in firm survival, supporting the precautionary motive.
Firms with large cash holdings are less likely to exit from the industry and this effect is
strong during the crisis for business groups. I then find cash policy is also associated with
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firm performance. The Asian financial crisis increased the effect of cash on all firms market
performance, and a positive association between cash and performance for non-chaebol firms
can be observed after the crisis. However, cash does not play a significant role in chaebol
firms because of their fewer financial constraints and agency problems.
Before the crisis, I observe that internal cash within the chaebols was effective and efficient
for the performance of affiliates since the internal capital market inside the business groups
is an additional financial resource. However, the internal liquidity became less meaningful.
The crisis changed not only the external environment but also the internal capital market.
The less inefficient internal capital market in turn affected the dependence on the firms own
cash holdings, with intensified financial constraints.
Additionally, the affiliate characteristics strongly influence the relationship between group
liquidity and performance. In particular, my results indicate that group liquidity supported
the affiliate with the highest total sales in the same group, consistent with the assumed
efficiency of the internal capital market in the pre-crisis period. Regarding the industry
growth potential, group liquidity is more highly focused on the affiliates operating in markets
with a high Tobin’s Q after the crisis.
Finally, the ownership structure inside a business group is worth examining in terms
of relationship between cash and market performance. The Korean chaebols have been
criticized for their complicated cross-holding shares and pyramidal structures, allowing the
controlling shareholder to influence all the affiliates with small shares. In particular, the
disparity between cash flow rights and voting rights, tunneling (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002;
Baek, Kang, and Lee, 2006) and propping (Bae, Cheon, and Kang, 2008), or the placement
of firms in the pyramid (Almeida et al., 2011) can determine cash’s impact on performance.
Therefore, the interaction between cash holdings and ownership in chaebols is an interesting
topic for future research.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: Firm Survival
Variables All Exit BG
Exit=0 Exit=1 Difference non-BG BG Difference
Exit 0.017 0.000 0.271 -0.271*** 0.016 0.034 -0.018***
Cash 0.114 0.116 0.089 -0.027*** 0.116 0.092 -0.024***
Size 17.292 17.299 17.186 0.113*** 17.180 19.099 -1.918***
Age 17.094 17.274 14.407 2.867*** 16.843 21.179 -4.336***
Leverage 0.291 0.287 0.355 -0.068*** 0.295 0.231 0.064***
Profitability 0.096 0.097 0.084 0.013*** 0.096 0.101 -0.004***
Collateral 0.319 0.320 0.306 0.014*** 0.317 0.356 -0.039***
MES 17.057 17.061 17.007 0.054*** 17.044 17.282 -0.238***
BG dummy 0.058 0.053 0.125 -0.072*** 0.000 1.000
N 81,821 76,668 5,153 77,078 4,743
Notes: This table presents the mean values of characteristics for exit firms or not and chaebol (BG)
firms or not during the sample period. The differences in the means (medians) between chaebol
firms and non-chaebol firms are evaluated using Z-statistics (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Significant
at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
34
Table 2.2: Effect of Cash on Firm Exit: Baseline estimation
Cash
Baseline dy/dx
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Leverage 1.583*** 1.219*** 1.257*** 0.021
(11.40) (8.44) (8.59)
Profitability -2.298*** -2.177*** -2.168*** -0.037
(-8.06) (-7.55) (-7.38)
Collateral -0.804*** -1.087*** -1.048*** -0.018
(-5.16) (-6.83) (-6.56)
Size -0.0333 -0.127*** -0.0437 -0.001
(-1.07) (-6.33) (-1.41)
MES -0.201*** -0.177*** -0.003
(-3.28) (-2.74)
Exchange -0.261* -0.233 -0.004
(-1.72) (-1.53)
Cash -2.742*** -2.651*** -0.045
(-6.63) (-6.40)
Age=2 0.384 0.176 0.407 0.007
(1.53) (0.76) (1.62)
Age=3 0.895*** 0.668*** 0.894*** 0.015
(4.14) (3.42) (4.12)
Age=4 0.858*** 0.623*** 0.848*** 0.014
(4.03) (3.23) (3.96)
Age=5 0.982*** 0.765*** 0.987*** 0.017
(4.73) (4.13) (4.73)
Age≥6 0.665*** 0.465*** 0.674*** 0.012
(3.57) (2.88) (3.59)
Age≥11 0.333* 0.136 0.338** 0.006
(1.81) (0.85) (1.83)
Age≥21 0.0439 -0.117 0.054 0.001
(0.23) (-0.68) (0.28)
Age≥31 -0.116 -0.238 -0.093 -0.002
(-0.54) (-1.20) (-0.44)
N 79,293 79,293 79,293
Log likelihood -6675 -6645 -6636
Notes: This table presents results from Logit regressions that estimate the impact of cash holdings
on firm exit. The regressions include industry effects at three digit KSIC and firm ages in duration.
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Cash on Firm Exit with Chaebol affiliations
BG non-BG All dy/dx
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Leverage 2.136*** 1.234*** 1.305*** 0.022
(4.27) (7.94) (8.93)
Profitability -0.988 -2.408*** -2.259*** -0.038
(-1.05) (-7.77) (-7.66)
Collateral 0.337 -1.204*** -1.052*** -0.018
(0.66) (-6.88) (-6.54)
Size -0.235*** -0.186*** -0.194*** -0.003
(-3.33) (-4.64) (-5.70)
MES -0.274 -0.0241 -0.053 -0.001
(-1.03) (-0.33) (-0.72)
Exchange 1.679*** -0.403** -0.157 -0.003
(3.68) (-2.50) (-1.03)






Age=2 -1.077 0.589** 0.625** 0.011
(-1.63) (1.98) (2.11)
Age=3 -0.256 1.050*** 1.084*** 0.018
(-0.49) (3.93) (4.08)
Age=4 0.133 0.959*** 0.998*** 0.017
(0.27) (3.62) (3.79)
Age=5 -0.003 1.133*** 1.183*** 0.020
(-0.01) (4.38) (4.60)
Age≥6 0.149 0.789*** 0.844*** 0.014
(0.36) (3.29) (3.54)
Age≥11* -0.142 0.475** 0.526** 0.009
(-0.37) (2.00) (2.22)
Age≥21 -0.090 0.131 0.172 0.003
(-0.25) (0.54) (0.70)
Age≥31 -0.161 0.034 0.0670 0.001
(-0.41) (0.13) (0.25)
N 4,094 74,544 79,293
Log likelihood -601 -5889 -6570
Notes: This table presents results from Logit regressions that estimate the impact of cash holdings
on firm survival. The regressions include industry dummies and firm ages in duration. t-statistics
are in parentheses. BG firms in column (1) and non BG firms in column (2). In column (3), I
include the interaction term between BG and Cash. Averaged marginal effects from column (3) is
in column (4). Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Cash on Firm Exit with the Asian Financial Crisis
All dy/dx BG non-BG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Leverage 1.129*** 0.019 1.847*** 1.122***
(7.66) (3.67) (7.17)
Profitability -2.282*** -0.039 -1.136 -2.542***
(-7.70) (-1.24) (-8.11)
Collateral -1.032*** -0.018 0.430 -1.194***
(-6.44) (0.84) (-6.82)
Size -0.062** -0.001 -0.243*** -0.204***
(-2.00) (-3.38) (-5.05) )
MES -0.190*** -0.003 -0.287 -0.034
(-3.56) (-1.09) (-0.55)
Exchange 0.614*** 0.010 2.336*** 0.463**
(3.49) (4.15) (2.50)
Cash -2.387*** -0.041 -1.515 -2.291***
(-5.31) (-1.27) (-4.75)
Cash*AFC -1.654* -0.028 -10.29** -1.301
(-1.71) (-2.19) (-1.34)
AFC 1.134*** 0.019 2.047*** 0.714
(3.01) (3.52) (1.27)
N 79,293 4,067 74,544 79,261
Log likelihood -6561 -590 -5820 -6486
Notes: This table presents results from Logit regressions that estimate the impact of cash holdings
on firm survival with the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998). The regressions include industry
dummies, firm ages in duration and all interactions between the Asian Financial Crisis. All firms
in column (1) with averaged marginal effects (2). BG firms in column (3) and non BG firms in
column (4). t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.5: Robustness check: Effect of Average Cash in Pre-Crisis on Firm Exit during the
Asian Financial Crisis
(1) (2)



































Log likelihood -1210 -1193
Notes: This table presents results from Logit regressions that estimate the impact of previous cash
holdings on firm survival in the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998). Pre Cash is calculated by the
average cash holdings over three years (1994-1996) for each firm. The regressions include industry
dummies and firm ages in duration. I include the interactions with BG dummies in column (2).
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Size 16.751 16.494 1.277 11.429 24.780 103,333
Return on Assets(ROA) 0.096 0.088 0.197 -54.594 1.184 103,333
Cash 0.116 0.074 0.125 -0.379 0.965 103,333
Leverage 0.118 0.072 0.137 0.000 0.907 103,333
Investment 0.025 0.003 0.281 -62.772 0.947 100,237
Cash Flow 0.065 0.058 0.206 -51.786 12.469 103,328
BG Cash 0.900 0.000 4.189 0.000 23.564 103,333
Fin Affiliates 0.123 0.000 0.786 0.000 10.000 103,333
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample, which consists of non-financial and
non-utility firm-years from 1992 to 2006 with non-missing data on cash holdings and on the industry
codes of each business segment. See the Appendix for variable definition.
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Table 2.7: Univariate test: non-Chaebols vs. Chaebols
Mean Median
Variables non-BG BG Difference non-BG BG Difference
Panel A: Pre-crisis (1992-1996)
Size 19.093 16.727 2.366*** 19.116 16.512 2.604***
ROA 0.083 0.086 -0.003 0.074 0.079 -0.005
Cash 0.058 0.098 -0.04*** 0.039 0.072 -0.033***
Leverage 0.151 0.139 0.012*** 0.134 0.114 0.021***
Investment 0.060 0.041 0.019*** 0.030 0.015 0.015***
Cash Flow 0.035 0.045 -0.01*** 0.026 0.035 -0.009***
BG Cash 19.944 0.000 19.960 0.000
Fin Affiliates 2.589 0.000 2.000 0.000
Panel B: Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998)
Size 19.242 16.462 2.78*** 19.223 16.309 2.914***
ROA 0.095 0.095 0.000 0.087 0.090 -0.003
Cash 0.070 0.109 -0.039*** 0.047 0.075 -0.028***
Leverage 0.156 0.152 0.004 0.136 0.116 0.020***
Investment 0.050 0.021 0.029*** 0.023 -0.001 0.024***
Cash Flow 0.037 0.050 -0.013*** 0.036 0.043 -0.007***
BG Cash 20.616 0.000 20.511 0.000
Fin Affiliates 4.027 0.000 3.000 0.000
Panel C: Post-crisis (1999-2006)
Size 19.045 16.650 2.395*** 18.955 16.451 2.504***
ROA 0.111 0.098 0.013*** 0.102 0.091 0.011***
Cash 0.111 0.124 -0.013*** 0.060 0.077 -0.016***
Leverage 0.082 0.107 -0.025**** 0.036 0.052 -0.016***
Investment -0.018 0.022 -0.04*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001***
Cash Flow 0.081 0.073 0.008* 0.081 0.069 0.012***
BG Cash 20.353 0.000 20.222 0.000
Fin Affiliates 2.564 0.000 2.000 0.000
Notes: This table presents the mean and median values of characteristics for chaebol firms and
non-chaebol firms in the pre-crisis period (panel A), the crisis period (panel B) and in the post-
crisis period (panel C). The differences in the means between chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms
are evaluated using t-statistics and the differences in the medians are evaluated using Z-statistics
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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effects Lags2 Lags3 Lags7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ROA 0.626*** 0.313*** 0.490*** 0.495*** 0.494***
(62.65) (13.36) (35.63) (40.14) (40.20)
Cash 0.010* 0.003 0.021 0.013 0.020*
(1.73) (0.29) (1.48) (0.98) (1.73)
Leverage 0.032*** 0.048*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.018***
(5.84) (5.36) (2.53) (2.55) (3.06)
Investment 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.83) (0.08) (0.75) (0.79) (1.03)
Size 0.000 -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(-0.81) (-3.17) (-6.17) (-6.79) (-6.18)
Cash flow -0.005 -0.014 0.008 0.007 0.007
(-0.60) (-1.46) (0.87) (0.95) (0.91)
Constant -0.003 0.000 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(-0.72) (0.28) (4.65) (5.67) (5.43)
N 86,760 86,760 86,760 86,760 86,760
R-sq 0.034 0.052
AR(2) 0.398 0.372 0.373
Notes: This table presents results from OLS, Fixed effects, and Dynamic GMM regressions that
estimate the impact of firm cash holdings on a firms performance. All variables are adjusted by
industry-mean. All estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are provided in parentheses.
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Cash on Firm Performance with Chaebol affiliations
BG BG BG30 non-BG Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)BG (6)BG30
ROA 0.473*** 0.489*** 0.444*** 0.497*** 0.491*** 0.495***
(8.03) (8.10) (7.23) (38.47) (38.21) (38.76)
Cash -0.080** -0.135*** -0.096** 0.023* 0.023* 0.024*







Leverage 0.049** 0.041* 0.038 0.015** 0.016*** 0.017***
(2.03) (1.86) (1.52) (2.43) (2.59) (2.68)
Investment 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.15) (0.22) (0.10) (0.94) (0.70) (0.75)
Size -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(-2.69) (-3.42) (-4.13) (-5.87) (-5.50) (-6.01)
Cash flow -0.025 -0.028 -0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009







Constant 0.025*** 0.017** 0.026*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.017***
(2.90) (2.49) (3.10) (4.16) (3.84) (5.54)
N 3,682 3,682 3,350 83,078 86,760 83,692
AR(2) 0.276 0.276 0.36 0.412 0.385 0.307
Notes: This table presents estimates from dynamic GMM regressions explaining firm performance
for 1992 to 2006. The regressions are estimated separately for all chaebols(BG), top 30 chaebols
(BG30), and non-chaebols(non-BG). Also, the results from pooled regressions by including inter-
action terms with business group dummies are reported. All estimations include year fixed effects
and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.10: Effect of Cash on Firm Performance with the Asian Financial Crisis
PanelA: Crisis period of 1997-1998 PanelB: Crisis period of 1997-2000
All BG BG30 non-BG All BG BG30 non-BG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROA 0.496*** 0.470*** 0.445*** 0.492*** 0.495*** 0.470*** 0.444*** 0.498***
(39.90) (7.69) (7.00) (35.30) (39.14) (8.11) (7.11) (37.38)
Cash -0.040*** -0.192 -0.210** -0.028* -0.044*** -0.201** -0.229*** -0.036**
(-2.66) (-1.41) (-2.35)) (-1.77) (-3.03) (-2.43) (-2.80) (-2.44)
Cash*AFC 0.015 0.162 0.167** 0.008
(0.91) (1.53) (2.02) (0.49)
Cash*Post 0.052** 0.127* 0.128 0.053***
(3.18) (1.44) (3.00)
Cash*AFC00 0.014 0.139* 0.144** 0.014
(0.92) (1.86) (1.97) (0.89)
Cash*Post00 0.055*** 0.123 0.129 0.054***
(3.46) (1.42) (1.50) (3.30)
Leverage 0.015** 0.046* 0.036 0.014** 0.014** 0.044** 0.033 0.013**
(2.42) (1.81) (1.40) (2.25) (2.30) (1.97) (1.36) (2.18)
Investment 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.77) (0.19) (0.15) (0.87) (0.73) (0.19) (0.15) (0.88)
Size -0.008*** -0.012** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.008***
(-6.76) (-2.51) (-4.00) (-6.12) (-6.90) (-3.49) (-3.62) (-5.95)
Cash flow 0.007 -0.025 -0.006 0.009 0.008 -0.023 -0.004 0.009
(0.96) (-0.47) (-0.12) (0.91) (0.98) (-0.44) (-0.07) (0.94)
Constant 0.007*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.006***
N 86,760 3,682 3,350 83,078 86,760 3,682 3,350 83,078
AR(2) 0.36 0.285 0.373 0.423 0.354 0.301 0.405 0.39
Notes: This table presents estimates from dynamic GMM regressions explaining firm performance for 1992 to 2006. The regressions
are estimated separately for all firms, all chaebols, top 30 chaebols, and non-chaebols with the crisis dummy. Panel A defines
the crisis (AFC) effect holds during 1997-1998. In panel B, I define the crisis period (AFC00) is 1997- 2000. Also, the results
from pooled regressions with business group dummy are reported. All estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are
in parentheses.Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Internal Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance
PanelA: BG firms PanelB: BG30 firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.440*** 0.440***
(7.85) (7.94) (7.00) (7.12)
Leverage 0.051** 0.049** 0.040 0.039
(2.07) (2.06) (1.47) (1.43)
Investment 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.08)
Size -0.012** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(-2.56) (-2.80) (-3.45) (-3.52)
Cash flow -0.024 -0.023 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.07) (-0.08)
Cash -0.082** -0.076** -0.104** -0.096**
(-1.99) (-1.85) (-2.42) (-2.23)
BG Cash 0.000 0.000
(0.81) (1.53)
Fin Affiliates 0.002 0.001
(1.30) (1.19)
Constant 0.0190* 0.022** 0.021** 0.026***
(1.69) (2.43) (2.22) (2.82)
N 3,682 3,682 3,350 3,350
AR(2) 0.260 0.282 0.351 0.376
Notes: This table presents estimates from dynamic GMM regressions explaining firm performance
for 1992 to 2006. The regressions are estimated separately with two group liquidity, (i)log of all
other affiliates’ cash (BG Cash) and (ii) the number of financial affiliates (Fin Affiliates). Panel A
is for all chaebols and Panel B is for only top thirty chaebols. All estimations include year fixed
effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.12: Effect of Internal Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance with the Asian Financial Crisis
PanelA: BG Cash PanelB: Financial Affiliates
BG BG30 BG BG30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROA 0.469*** 0.468*** 0.440*** 0.439*** 0.465*** 0.465*** 0.434*** 0.434***
(7.79) (7.88) (6.88) (6.83) (7.93) (7.92) (7.05) (7.07)
Leverage 0.050* 0.050** 0.040 0.040 0.048** 0.048** 0.037 0.038
(1.95) (2.04) (1.34) (1.32) (2.01) (1.99) (1.50) (1.51)
Investment 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.22) (0.20) (0.15) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03)
Size -0.012** -0.012*** -0.013** -0.013** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(-2.22) (-2.87) (-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.62) (-2.67) (-4.19) (-4.17)
Cash flow -0.025 -0.025 -0.004 -0.004 -0.022 -0.021 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.07) (-0.08) (-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.03) (-0.03)
Cash -0.073* -0.075* -0.094** -0.094** -0.076* -0.076* -0.097** -0.097**
(-1.71) (-1.79) (-1.98) (-1.97) (-1.82) (-1.82) (-2.25) (-2.23)
BG cash 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*
(2.08) (1.95) (2.29) (1.72)
BG cash*Pre -0.001 -0.001
(-0.67) (-0.73)
BG cash*Post -0.002* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001
(-1.91) (-1.77) (-1.83) (-1.32)
Fin Affiliates 0.003* 0.003 0.003** 0.003**
(1.65) (1.53) (2.02) (2.00)
Fin Affiliates*Pre 0.000 -0.001
(-0.16) (-0.65)
Fin Affiliates*Post -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* -0.003*
(-1.12) (-1.04) (-1.72) (-1.69)
Constant -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012
(-0.37) (-0.16) (-0.33) (-0.06) (0.60) (0.59) (1.07) (1.13)
N 3,682 3,682 3,350 3,350 3,682 3,682 3,350 3,350
AR(2) 0.255 0.263 0.34 0.351 0.290 0.288 0.397 0.389
Notes: This table presents estimates from dynamic GMM regressions explaining firm performance for 1992 to 2006. The regressions
are estimated separately with two group liquidity, (i) log of all other affiliates’ cash (BG Cash) in Panel A and (ii) the number
of financial affiliates (Fin Affiliates) in Panel B. All estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses.
Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.13: Effect of Internal Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance with Allocation of Internal capital market
Total sales Investment opportunity
Pre-crisis(1992-1996) AFC-Post(1997-2006) Pre-crisis(1992-1996) AFC-Post(1997-2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROA 0.728*** 0.711*** 0.435*** 0.434*** ROA 0.739*** 0.705*** 0.444*** 0.439***
(6.33) (6.16) (6.19) (6.14) (6.38) (5.98) (6.24) (6.34)
Leverage 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.043 0.037 Leverage 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.054 0.037
(2.80) (2.89) (1.12) (0.98) (2.89) (2.82) (1.42) (1.02)
Investment 0.021 0.017 -0.001 -0.001 Investment 0.013 0.011 0.004 0.003
(0.75) (0.59) (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.48) (0.38) (0.24) (0.14)
Size -0.012** -0.012** -0.012*** -0.011*** Size -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.010***
(-2.17) (-2.24) (-2.91) (-2.77) (-2.30) (-2.32) (-2.56) (-2.58)
Cash flow -0.189 -0.178 -0.013 -0.012 Cash flow -0.200* -0.176 -0.011 -0.010
(-1.62) (-1.53) (-0.24) (-0.22) (-1.67) (-1.45) (-0.20) (-0.19)
Cash -0.066 -0.071 -0.049 -0.048 Cash -0.057 -0.078 -0.037 -0.037
(-0.62) (-0.66) (-1.02) (-1.00) (-0.61) (-0.79) (-0.76) (-0.76)
BG Cash 0.004 0.003 BG Cash 0.007* 0.003**
(1.08) (1.52) (1.88) (2.18)
BG Cash*
Max Sales 0.002*** 0.000
BG Cash*
Med Qnon -0.006* 0.008***
(7.69) (-0.05) (-1.81) (3.25)
Fin. Affiliates 0.002 0.000 Fin Affiliates 0.004* -0.001
(1.05) (0.17) (1.78) (-0.53)
Fin Affiliates*
Max Sales 0.037*** 0.014
Fin Affiliates*
Med Qnon -0.003 0.003**
(6.35) (0.98) (-1.25) (2.02)
Max Sales -0.009 -0.041 Med Qnon 0.122* -0.001 -0.174*** -0.016**
(-0.05) (-1.06) (1.69) (-0.12) (-3.31) (-2.19)
Constant -0.060 0.003 -0.040 0.023** Constant -0.118 0.001 -0.044 0.028**
(-0.73) (0.19) (-0.95) (2.08) (-1.50) (0.06) (-1.42) (2.40)
N 1,309 1,309 2,373 2,373 N 1,309 1,309 2,373 2,373
AR(2) 0.380 0.378 0.320 0.327 AR(2) 0.344 0.374 0.311 0.303
Notes: This table presents the dynamic GMM regression results of group liquidity allocations. Max Sales is a dummy variable
with a value of one for affiliates with the highest total sales within chaebol and zero otherwise; Med Qnon is a dummy variable with
a value of one for chaebols’ industries showing above median Tobin’s Q, calculated from non-chaebol firms, and zero otherwise.
All estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 2.14: Robustness check: Effect of Liquidity in Chaebols on Firm Performance
Panel A: Cash Panel B: BG cash
All BG BG30 non-BG All BG BG30 non-BG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROA 0.529*** 0.386*** 0.340*** 0.543*** 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.347*** 0.336***
(24.86) (5.17) (4.11) (23.55) (5.07) (7.14) (4.01) (4.48)
Leverage 0.025** 0.118*** 0.115*** 0.018 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.122** 0.127**
(2.29) (3.32) (3.23) (1.50) (3.47) (2.87) (2.32) (2.47)
Investment 0.002 0.035** 0.035** 0.001 0.034** 0.035** 0.034** 0.034*
(0.30) (2.09) (2.25) (0.12) (1.98) (2.02) (2.34) (1.65)
Size 0.000 -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.005* -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.08) (-5.36) (-3.96) (1.71) (-5.05) (-4.38) (-3.59) (-4.23)
Cash flow 0.008 0.008 0.043 0.006 0.033 0.040 0.044 0.049
(0.55) (0.10) (0.50) (0.38) (0.49) (0.79) (0.48) (0.79)
Cash -0.030** -0.221 -0.231 -0.030** 0.033 0.033 -0.006 0.005
(-2.10) (-1.33) (-0.69) (-2.02) (0.44) (0.23) (-0.03) (0.02)
Cash*AFC 0.020 0.271** 0.273 0.023
(1.06) (2.18) (1.29) (1.24)
Cash*Post 0.041*** 0.280 0.215 0.050***
(2.81) (1.63) (0.51) (3.19)
BG cash 0.003* 0.002** 0.003** 0.002
(1.95) (2.34) (2.15) (0.79)
BG cash*Pre -0.003 -0.002
(-0.60) (-0.74)
BG cash*Post -0.002 -0.001* -0.003 -0.002
(-1.63) (-1.79) (-1.48) (-0.58)
Constant -0.001 0.035*** 0.032 -0.001 -0.034 -0.007 -0.033 0.032
(-0.37) (4.04) (1.59) (-0.65) (-1.18) (-0.39) (-1.15) (0.78)
N 16,070 1,279 1,151 14,791 1,279 1,279 1,151 1,151
AR(2) 0.645 0.241 0.307 0.947 0.202 0.203 0.210 0.249
Notes: This table presents robustness checks for the dynamic GMM regressions of firm’s own cash (Panel A) and business group
liquidity (Panel B) on firm performance with only firms which are available in a whole sample period(1992-2006). All estimations
include year fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Figure 2.1: Average annual cash to total assets ratios for non-chaebol and chaebol firms
Notes: This figure displays the average ratio of cash to total assets of non-chaebol and chaebol firm
in the sample from 1992 to 2006. I exclude firms operating in financial and utility industries. Cash
to assets is cash and short-term financial instruments divided by total assets. Chaebol is Korean
business groups. I follow Korean Fair Trade Committee (KFTC) guidelines to classify chaebol, a
set of firms controlled directly or indirectly by the controlling shareholder.
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Chapter 3
The Determinants of Cash holdings:




The management of cash is irrelevant to firms’ financing and value in a perfect market but
cash has long been studied in the real world in the context of frictions, such as transaction
costs, agency problems, and information asymmetry. The trade-off model introduced by
Miller and Orr (1966) and Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) reveals that the optimal level
of cash is determined when the costs of additional cash are offset by its benefits. Cash
holding is beneficial because firms do not need to liquidate other assets to finance a new
project, yet the valuable forgone investments incur costs.
Contrary to this, the financing hierarchy model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) asserts the
order of preferred financing choice based on the assumption that there is no optimal level
of cash, given that cash is available when the firm’s generated internal funds exceed its
investment. Moreover, the empirical literature after Opler et al. (1999) has examined cash
policies under different settings for corporate governance (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson,
2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008), information
asymmetry (Drobetz, Grninger, and Hirschvogl, 2010), and financial constraints (Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov,
2010). This paper examines how business group affiliation affects the level of cash holdings
while providing a partial answer to a more fundamental question: whether the nature of a
cash policy depends on the organizational form.
Business groups consist of independent firms that operate in many industries and are
linked through equity holdings or family relationships (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005;
Khanna and Yafeh, 2005, 2007). These firms, prevalent in Europe and Asia, are characterized
by concentrated ownership through a pyramidal structure or cross-shareholdings rather than
by the dispersed ownership structure, which is common in the U.S. and the U.K. (La Porta
et al., 2000).
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Korea is an appropriate environment for the study of business groups, and many aspects
of its business groups have already been studied, such as tunneling and propping (Bae, Kang,
and Kim, 2002; Baek, Kang, and Lee, 2006; Bae, Cheon, and Kang, 2008), the investment
sensitivity of cash flows (Shin and Park, 1999; Song and Lee, 2012) and their structure
(Almeida et al., 2011). Khanna and Yafeh (2007) presents a good summary of English-
language articles on Korean business groups during the 1988 to 2005 period. Korea has
significant business groups, called “chaebols,” which dominate the economy. The ten biggest
chaebols have attained over half of the total market capitalization on the Korean Stock
Exchange, with total sales of around 70% of GDP since 2010. A single-country analysis
allows me a clear definition of business groups and guidelines as set by a single government,
by which I may avoid the endogeneity problem from the correlation between country-level
legal protection and business group strucuture latent in cross-country studies (Khanna, 2000;
Joh, 2003).
Studies on business groups show that group membership lowers cash holdings. Deloof
(2001) shows that intra-group claims, which are flexible to a firms liquidity needs, reduce
the cash balances of Belgian firms. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) reveal that “keiretsu”
affiliation is negatively related to cash holdings in Japan. To the best of my knowledge, little
attention has been paid to group-specific characteristics, with internal funds and diversity
being determinants of the cash held by firms belong to business groups.
First, I examine whether group funds serve as an additional substitute for costly external
capital and member firms’ own cash in the same chaebol. As a result of several substituting
determinants such as net working capital, bonds, and debt ratio found in the literature, firms
do not need to bear costs of holding cash when other sources of capital are available. If a
firm belongs to a business group with abundant capital, the level of cash holdings of that
firm is smaller than that of the non-group firms. This is related to the literature on internal
capital markets in business groups, which affiliates share resources and enjoy lower financial
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constraints.
Diversity in groups also plays an important role in the cash policy of the affiliates. Binding
with other firms also reflects the various operations. Thus, business groups consisting of
affiliates having imperfectly correlated growth potential and/or cash flow do not need to
reserve cash for future projects or precautionary cash against future adverse shock as much
as stand-alone firms. The more diversified (co-insured) the group, the less the cash holdings.
I measure diversification of chaebols with the number of industries, correlation in investment
opportunities calculated at the industry/ firm level, and correlation in cash flows at firm
level.
Using Korean data for listed firms in the 1993 to 2006 period, this paper finds that
chaebol firms hold significantly less cash than non-chaebol firms after controlling for other
determinants of cash cited in previous literature, such as size, leverage, investment opportu-
nity, net working capital, risks, payout, and dividends. I find that chaebol firms affiliated to
financial firms have a lower level of cash holdings but cash or cash flow in other affiliates are
not meaningful to those firms’ cash policy. Diversification and cash holdings inside chaebol
have a negative relationship, but only the industry-level measures are significant. However,
these first results do not take into account the effects of the Asian financial crisis.
The Asian financial crisis is one of the most important aspects in the context of financial
constraints. Regardless of organizational form, costs of external financing increases and in
particular, chaebol firms are not able to guarantee other affiliates’ loans in banks. This wors-
ened external capital market would change the relationship between chaebol affiliation and
cash policy. I re-estimate previous regressions by restricting the sample and including only
the post-crisis years as a financially constrained period. I show that both effects of group
funds and diversification have increased, with significant impact on the level of cash hold-
ings. Firms belonging to chaebols with large cash, financial affiliates, and more diversified
operations can reserve less cash than non-chaebol firms after the crisis. This is consistent
52
with the fact that the value of cash depends on the financial constraints.
This paper contributes to the literature on cash holding by examining business groups
with diversification. My results provide evidence that the affiliation of business groups has
changed firms cash policy empirically. This paper also adds to the business group literature
how business group firms survive and prosper by showing the advantage in reduced costs of
holding cash.
This paper is organized as follows. I briefly discuss the hypotheses in Section 2. Section
3 describes the empirical method. Section 4 describes data and provides the descriptive
statistics. Section 5 analyzes the determinants of cash holdings in chaebol and non-chaebol
firms, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Hypotheses
Business group firms share resources in both formal and informal ways. Prior research finds
that member firms are less financially constrained through group reputation, internal debt
and intra-group relations (Deloof, 2001; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Ferris, Kim, and
Kitsabunnarat, 2003; Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru, 2007), and emphasizes the importance of
the internal capital market. Funds inside a business group can be perceived as another
substitute for cash holdings of member firms. Firms can lower the amount of cash holdings
if they have other sources of capital. Empirical studies on cash holdings since Kim, Mauer,
and Sherman (1998); Opler et al. (1999) have shown various forms of substitutes for cash
holdings. Firms that have an easier access to the debt market, issue bonds, or have large
net working capital can hold a lower amount of cash.
As a direct measure of group funds, I expect that member firms with large cash holdings
in other affiliates under the same controlling shareholder can lower their own cash holdings
compared with non-group firms. In addition, the existence of financial affiliates inside a
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group has a negative impact on cash holdings of member firms. Financial affiliates inside
Korean chaebols do not have a dominant power over groups but they operate to supplement
external and internal funds of other affiliates.
(H1) Firms that belong to business groups with i) large cash (cash flow) in
other affiliates or ii) financial affiliates can lower their cash holdings.
Business groups have affiliates operating in related and unrelated industries. For example,
“few people know that Samsung Group makes summery dresses and blouses. Even fewer
are likely to remember that the South Korean conglomerate famous for its microchips and
mobile phones rose to prominence in the 1950s as a woolen mill.”(“Evolution is crucial to
chaebol survival,” Financial T imes, June 2011.)
The diversification in business groups also leads to an imperfect correlation between
investment opportunities and generated cash flows. This group-level smoothening can lower
the risk of default and financing constraints. Thus, I expect that the diversification in groups
also affects the members firm-level cash holdings. As the trade-off model argues, firms try to
maintain consistent financing for their future investments by using reserve cash as a fraction
of assets while giving up investments today, which is the cost of holding cash.
Diversification is also related to precautionary demand for cash by Keynes (1937), which
means that firms hold cash against future adverse shocks. In more diversified business groups,
the higher the hedge against adverse shocks, the lower the amount of cash.
This paper closely follows a recent line of enquiry on the relationship between cash policy
and firm diversification in the U.S. Duchin (2010) and Subramaniam et al. (2011) argue that
diversified firms with complementary growth opportunities across segments hold significantly
less cash within an active internal capital market. In addition, the value of cash in diversified
firms is lower than that in focused firms, as shown in Tong (2011).
(H2) Business groups with diversified investment opportunities or cash flows
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can hold less cash than non-group firms.
3.3 Empirical model
Following Opler et al. (1999), I introduce variables to control for the determinants of cash
holdings: size, leverage, growth opportunity, cash flow, net working capital, R&D costs,
payout, bonds, and risks:
Cashi,t = α + β1Sizei,t + β2Leveragei,t + β3Investment opportunitiesi,t
+ β4Cash flowi,t + β5Net working capitali,t + β6Investmenti,t
+ β7R&D Costsi,t + β8Payouti,t + β9Bondi,t
+ β10Industry sigmai,t + β11Firm sigmai,t
+ β12BG Characteristicsi,t + ηi + νt + i,t (3.1)
Cash is defined as the sum of cash and marketable securities over total assets following the
literature. Size is defined as a natural logarithm of total assets. Cash is more valuable for
smaller firms because large firms enjoy economies of scale in terms of fixed costs for external
financing and are able to sell redundant assets to finance capital. Leverage is calculated as
total debt divided by total assets. Growth opportunity is measured as the market-to-book
ratio (Tobin’s Q). Firms with a higher Q are expected to have valuable growth options in the
future. Firms with high-growth opportunities are likely to hold a lot of cash for investment.
Cash flow is earnings before depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Net
working capital, defined as working capital minus cash scaled by total assets, is considered
a substitute for cash because it can be easily converted to cash. R&D is calculated as the
research and development expenses divided by total sales. The payout dummy is equal to 1
if firms pay dividends to shareholders and is zero otherwise. I also include a Bonds dummy,
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set to 1 when firms issue bonds in that year and zero otherwise.
Riskier firms tend to maintain a higher level of cash holdings. A companys risk is twofold
and measured by the firm and industry sigma. Firm sigma is proxied by the cash flow
volatility of a firm within a three-year window. The median of firm sigma in each industry,
based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC), the Korean form
of the SIC, measures the industry sigma.
I now outline the liquidity and diversification of chaebols, the main interest of this paper.
First, I introduce four measures for group funds. The first variable is a direct measure of the
cash of the other affiliates in the same business group. I calculate the sum of the cash for
each chaebol and subtract the firm’s own cash. Then, I take its logarithm and name it “BG
Cash”. “BG Cash flow” is measured the same way with cash flows. The third measure is
“Fin.AFF No”, the number of chaebols’ financial intermediaries. Lastly, I include a dummy
variable “Fin.AFF D”, set to 1 if financial affiliates exist inside chaebols. I expect these
proxied variables that imply an alternative financial resource to be negatively related to the
level of cash holdings.
For the complementary growth of chaebols, which affects cash holding levels, I employ
the diversification measures in the estimation. For robustness, I use four diversity measures.
First, I include the number of operating industries as a two-digit KSIC for each group
(INDN), a traditional but vague measure, as the growth potentials of highly correlated
industries may move together.
Another industry-level diversification is Q-correlation across industries (INDQcorr). I
calculate the yearly industry Q-correlation for each group as Subramaniam et al. (2011) and
Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas (2011). I first obtain the median of Tobin’s Q in each industry at
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where Corr(m,n) is the correlation between investment opportunity of industries m and n
and wm,k,wn,k is the weight of industries m and n in the chaebol k, the ratio of assets in such
industry to the total assets of group.
Thus, a higher INDQcorr value, implying a higher correlation, indicates less diversified
chaebols. The value of non-chaebols and chaebols operate in one industry is equal to 1.
In addition, I adopt correlation measures across affiliates, the Q-correlation (AFFQcorr)
and the CF-correlation (AFFCFcorr), similar to correlation measures of diversified firms
in Duchin (2010). Explicit financial data for each listed affiliate are used to calculate the
correlation for chaebols. In contrast to the segment data (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga,
2004), each affiliate in the sample has accurate data, eliminating the need to proxy the growth
opportunity with the industry median.
First, I calculate the volatility of the affiliates as the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q
and the cash flow volatility for a three-year window. I then calculate the volatility of each





















where ρi,j is the correlation between investment opportunity or cash flow streams of affiliates
i and j and wi,wj is the weight of affiliates i and j in the business group k, the ratio of the
affiliate’s assets to the total assets.
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Finally, the Q-correlation and CF-correlation across affiliates are defined as:
AFFQcorrt,k = σ(Q)t,k − σ(Q)t,k
AFFCFcorrt,k = σ(CF )t,k − σ(CF )t,k (3.5)
Since ρ is zero for all non-chaebol firms, the Q- and CF-correlation are also zero. A higher
correlation in Tobin’s Q and cash flow means less-diversified business groups. Thus, both
AFFQcorr and AFFCFcorr are predicted to be positively associated with cash holdings.
3.4 Data
The data is from the Korea Information Service, which provides comprehensive financial
information on listed firms on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE). I supplement stock price
data with TS-2000 database of Korean Listed Firms Association. The sample covers the
1990 to 2006 period. I exclude firms operating in the financial and utility industries and
those lacking an industry code at the two-digit KSIC level. I also exclude firm-years with
missing financial information or asset or sales growth exceeding 100%, following Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007).
To examine the determinants of cash holdings in chaebol and non-chaebol firms, I classify
chaebol firms according to the guidelines of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). The
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KFTC defines a chaebol as a set of firms controlled directly or indirectly by the controlling
shareholder following two criteria: 1) it is a group of companies in which more than 30% of
the shares are owned by some individuals or companies and 2) there exists a cutoff for the
total value of group affiliates. Initially, only the thirty largest groups were included in this
category; as of 2001, however, any group above the combined total assets cutoff is included.
I include only those firms with a volatility measure on a past moving window of three
years; the sample period begins in 1993 and runs to 2006; it consists of 7,180 firm-year
observations on 701 firms. I select 5,662 firm-years for non-chaebols and 1,518 firm-years for
chaebols.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average cash measured as a percentage of assets
along the sample years for chaebol and non-chaebol firms. As with public U.S. firms (Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz, 2009), the figure indicates an upward trend in cash holdings for Korean
listed firms during the sample period. The figure also shows that non-chaebol firms hold a
higher level of cash than the chaebol affiliates even though the gap between the two groups
slightly narrows in the later years of the sample period.
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the whole sample. I contrast those char-
acteristics for chaebol and non-chaebol firms and report the statistical differences in Table
3.2. First, chaebol firms are significantly large in size for all periods. For the cash to total
asset ratio, the main variable of interest, chaebol firms hold a significantly lower level of cash
(5.8%) than do non-chaebol firms (9.8%), as expected. The literature presents the level of
cash holdings across countries. The mean of the cash to total assets ratio is between 8 and
10.5% for U.S. firms (Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz, 2009), between 9.9% and 12.4% for U.K. firms (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Brav, 2009),
14% for eight East Asian firms (Lee and Suh, 2011), and 13.7% for Japanese firms (Kato,
Li, and Skinner, 2011).
I also observe that chaebol firms are highly indebted and make more investments with
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larger generated funds than do non-chaebols. The companies affiliated with chaebols issue
bonds and pay dividends significantly more often than non-chaebols. I also find that the
growth opportunity of chaebol firms, proxied by Tobin’s Q, is higher. The risk a firm faces
is measured by the industry sigma and firm sigma. Non-chaebol firms operate in riskier
industries and have a higher level of firm risk. Finally, I represent chaebol characteristics in
business group funds (Panel B) and the level of diversification (Panel C).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Baseline estimation
I employ firm fixed effects regression with robust clustered errors at the firm level, and I
include year dummies for macroeconomic uncertainty. Table 3.3 presents the results from
the baseline estimation of the determinants of cash holdings. In column (1), I first present
the result of the regression without considering organizational forms. Small firms are likely
to hold more cash, but the coefficient is not significant. Size does not appear to be relevant to
the determinants of cash holdings in Korea. I observe that the Tobin’s Q has a significantly
positive association with the amount of cash, meaning that firms increase cash if they have a
higher growth potential. Firms with a higher debt ratio and larger net working capital hold
significantly lower amounts of cash. This result confirms the theory that these variables are
substitutes for cash. I also find that firms operating in risky industries tend to have a larger
amount of cash from the positive signs of firm and industry sigmas. Payouts to shareholders
are negatively associated with cash holdings in the U.S. (Opler et al., 1999), but the sign is
positive in Korea. In addition, firms issuing bonds show significantly lower cash holdings,
and R&D cost has no significant relationship with cash in Korea. Overall, these findings are
consistent with the transaction costs and precautionary demands for cash.
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In columns (2) to (4), I consider the chaebol affiliation in the baseline estimation. The
results from a pooled regression are shown in column (2) with the BG dummy. The sign and
significance of the BG dummy variable (-0.014) strongly supports the negative relationship
between chaebol affiliations and the amount of cash. Chaebol firms hold significantly less
cash than non-chaebol firms. Columns (3) to (4) report the results from the chaebol and
non-chaebol firms, respectively.
To compare the effect of each variable between chaebol and non-chaebol firms, I perform
a statistical test using “z-score” in column (5). z-score for each variable is calculated by
the difference between unstandardized coefficients from columns (3) and (4) divided by the
square root of the sum of two coefficients’ variances. Interestingly, I find that there is no
statistical difference of coefficients between two forms of organizations except Cash flow.
Cash flow has a significantly greater effect in non-chaebol firms. The coefficient of cash flow
for non-chaebol firms is economically significant, such that a one standard deviation increase
in cash flow of non-chaebol firms is associated with an increase in cash of about 0.6 percent
point. Given that most traditional determinants of cash holdings are independent of firm
structure, I try to answer how chaebol firms can hold lower levels of cash than non-chaebol
firms in the following sections
3.5.2 Funds in Chaebol
I first examine the sources of lower cash holdings in chaebol firms with group funds. Chaebol
affiliates have another source of financing in the internal capital market by sharing resources
inside the group. Thus, I expect that member firms can lower their cash holdings with
group-wide capital. To address group funds as a substitute for the firm’s own liquidity, I
introduce two direct measures–the log of other affiliates’ cash (BG Cash) and that of other
affiliates’ cash flow (BG Cash Flow). In addition, I also test the effect of financial affiliates
61
in the group. One is the number of financial affiliates (Fin.AFF No) and the other is the
dummy variable, which takes 1 if the business group has a listed firm (Fin.AFF D).
The results are shown in Table 3.4. In columns (1) and (2), I find no effect of BG Cash
and BG Cash Flow, as both insignificant coefficients are very small and close to zero. The
amount of cash holdings or cash flows in other members does not directly affect the level of
cash in affiliates.
However, the coefficient of Fin.AFF No is negative (-0.05) and statistically significant
at the 10% level in column (3) but that of Fin.AFF D is negative but insignificant. As
chaebols hold many financial affiliates, the member firms can have less cash holdings than
other firms. The estimate indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the number
of financial affiliates decreases cash by 3.3% of cash in the average firm. Financial firms in
chaebols are different from the main banks placed at the top of the keiretsu business group
in Japan. The biggest difference in the group structure is that Korean chaebols cannot
establish a bank inside the group. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) argue that large banks
lower information asymmetry so that member firms can lower their cash reserves. However,
abundant capital rather than the ability of reducing agency problem from financial firms in
Korean chaebols works as a substitute for affiliates cash.
3.5.3 Diversification in Chaebol
Now, I turn to the other group characteristic, the diversification. The existence of other
affiliates in the same business group also indicates smoothened group profits and risks. Thus,
the diversification inside the business group affects the cash policy of member firms similar to
stand-alone firms with multiple segments holding lower cash in U.S. studies (Duchin, 2010;
Subramaniam et al., 2011). The marginal value of cash decreases in chaebol firms with an
imperfect correlation with cash flows or growth potential.
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To test the effect of diversity inside chaebols, I include the four diversity measures that
were introduced in Section 3; the results are shown in Table 3.5. Column (1) presents the
results for INDN, which is the number of different operating industries at the two-digit
KSIC level in the sample. Similar to Opler et al. (1999)’s findings in diversified firms, the
coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level. The larger the number of different
operating industries in the chaebol, the lower the affiliates cash holdings. A one standard
deviation increase in the number of operating industry increases the cash ratio by 0.5 percent
point. In addition, the magnitude of correlation in industry-level investment opportunities
is associated with an increase of 6.7% in the mean cash holdings
Next, I include Q-correlation across operating industries in chaebols in column (2). IN-
DQcorr (0.026) has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 5% level, as expected.
If growth opportunities across operating industries are highly correlated in chaebols, firms
increase their cash reserves.
Industry-level measures are economically significant. However, columns (3), (4), and
(5), regarding firm-level diversification measures in Q and Cash flow, show insignificant
coefficients. The effect of AFFQcorr, the correlation in Tobin’s Q across affiliates, is not
definite at the cash holding level. I run the same regressions with AFFCFcorr in column
(3). There is a positive relationship (0.138) between the correlation of cash flow and cash
holdings but it is not significant. I run the same regressions with AFFCFcorr in columns (4)
and (5). The association between CF-correlation in chaebols and cash holdings in member
firms has the expected positive sign, but this is not significant.
3.5.4 The Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 would lead to a change in the relationship between
group characteristics and cash policy. The crisis is mainly related to the financial constraints
63
faced by firms and business groups. The cost of external financing is an important subject
in the literature on cash holdings. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) shows that cash
flows and cash are correlated only in firms with high external financing costs, supporting
Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s notion of the zero value of cash in a frictionless market.
After the governments reforms, such as a ban on cross-loan guarantees, chaebol firms’ access
to external capital became more difficult than that in the pre-crisis period. In addition,
Kim et al. (2004) shows that the relationship with the main bank, which is not affiliated to
chaebols, is attenuated as the interest-differential rises, and member firms increase their cash
holdings after the crisis. Thus, I expect the relationship observed in the previous section to
be significantly impacted after the crisis.
I repeat the regressions for the 1999 to 2006 period, after the Asian financial crisis in
1997 and 1998 and the results on group funds and diversity are shown in Table 3.6 and Table
3.7, respectively.
Group capital has a negative impact on cash holdings during the post-crisis period, as
seen in Table 3.6. Although previous regressions from Table 3.4 show an insignificant effect
of the two variables in group funds, I observe chaebol firms tend to have less cash if their
business groups reserve large cash and generate cash flows within other affiliates. Both
coefficients of BG Cash and BG Cash Flow are -0.001 and significant at the 5% level. In
columns (3) and (4), the effect of the number of financial affiliates (FinAFF No) is intensified
(-0.017, significant at the 1% level) over its effect in all periods after the crisis (see column
(3) of Table 3.4). Business groups recognize the funds inside chaebols as a reliable financing
method of lowering their own liquidity when external financing is costly. The magnitude of
estimates in one standard deviation increase of measures on group funds are associated with
an increase of 0.6 to 0.8%, such that 6.2% to 8.2% in cash of the average firm after the crisis.
I again examine the effect of diversity on firms’ cash after the crisis refer to Table 3.7.
As with group capital, diversity measures show the expected signs and greater effects than
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in the regressions described in Section 5.4. Columns (1) and (2) show that cash holdings are
significantly negatively related to different industries (INDN, -0.006) and to the Q correlation
across industries (INDQcorr, 0.057), consistent with the negative effect of complementary
investment opportunities on the dependence on cash. The economic magnitude of industry-
level diversification measures are significant. For example, a decrease (increase) of one stan-
dard deviation in the number of operating industries (the correlation across the industry’s
investment opportunity) leads to an increase of about 10% of the mean cash holdings after
the crisis.
Moreover, both Tobin’s Q and Cash Flow correlations across affiliates have positive coef-
ficients in columns (3)-(5). In particular, diversity in cash flows has a larger and significant
effect (0.9 and 0.832) on firms cash level than that in Q correlation (growth opportunity),
indicating that smooth cash flows are more important to lower the cash policy. Using the
estimate of the affiliate-level cash flow correlation in column (4), a one-standard-deviation
increase in correlation to cash flows corresponds to an increase of 4.1% in cash holdings of
the average firm during the post-crisis period.
3.6 Conclusion
Most of the literature on cash holdings has discussed firm structure in the context of diver-
sified firms with multiple segments. This paper contributes to the literature by examining
the sources of the negative relationship between affiliation to business groups and firms’ cash
policy using a sample of Korean listed firms from 1993 to 2006.
Affiliations to business groups have many advantages: group firms deter the entry of
rivals and a shared reputation brings a favorable relationship with suppliers and consumers.
In addition, affiliates share risks of default as well as resources. I extend the literature by
investigating the facts behind lower cash holdings for affiliates: the precautionary motive.
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To explain this difference in cash policy, I examine the determinants of cash using two
business group characteristics: group-wide funds and group-wide diversity. First, I find that
capital in other affiliates with direct measures of cash and cash flow held by other affiliates
in the same business group does not lead to lower cash holdings before the crisis. However,
affiliation to chaebols having financial affiliates leads to hold less cash throughout the sample
period. After the crisis, the negative impact of group capital becomes greater.
Co-insurance in diversified business groups is an important determinant of cash holdings.
Chaebol firms with imperfectly correlated investment opportunities or cash flows have re-
duced marginal value of cash, which in turn decreases the level of cash based on the trade-off
model of cash holdings. The evidence drawn through different measures demonstrates that
business groups hold lower levels of cash holdings, especially the evidence from the number
of different industries, Q-correlation across industries, and CF-correlation across affiliates.
Moreover, the extent of the diversification effect is strong, especially in the constrained
post-crisis corporate environment.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Median Std. dev Min Max Observations
Cash 0.090 0.062 0.087 0.000 0.726 7180
Size 19.115 18.942 1.400 13.809 24.780 7180
Leverage 0.293 0.256 0.298 0.000 8.320 7180
Tobin’s Q 0.987 0.895 0.720 0.207 26.778 7180
Cash flow 0.069 0.075 0.112 -3.131 0.685 7180
Net Wcapital -0.013 0.005 0.285 -7.327 0.729 7180
Investment 0.005 0.002 0.180 -7.841 0.626 7180
Dividend 0.652 1.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 7180
RD costs 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.259 7180
Bonds 0.316 0.000 0.465 0.000 1.000 7180
Firm sigma 0.029 0.019 0.048 0.000 1.359 7180
Industry sigma 0.020 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.220 7180
BG Liquidity
BG cash 3.777 0.000 7.672 0.000 22.971 7180
BG cash flow 3.835 0.000 7.893 0.000 23.654 7180
Fin.AFF No 0.203 0.000 0.629 0.000 4.000 7180
Fin.AFF D 0.115 0.000 0.319 0.000 1.000 7180
BG Diversification
INDN 1.603 1.000 1.577 1.000 9.000 7180
INDQcorr 0.943 1.000 0.138 0.352 1.000 7180
AFFQcorr -0.003 0.000 0.012 -0.178 0.000 7180
AFFCFcorr -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.027 0.000 7180
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample, which consists of non-financial and
non-utility firm-years from 1993 to 2006 with non-missing data on cash holdings and on the industry
codes of each business segment. See the Appendix for variable definition.
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Table 3.2: Univariate test: non-Chaebols vs. Chaebols
Mean Median
Variables non-BG BG Difference non-BG BG Difference
Cash 0.099 0.060 0.039*** 0.071 0.038 0.033***
Size 18.689 20.707 -2.018*** 18.654 20.771 -2.117***
Leverage 0.292 0.298 -0.006 0.250 0.285 -0.034***
Tobin’s Q 0.980 1.010 -0.030 0.878 0.941 -0.063***
Cash flow 0.064 0.086 -0.022*** 0.073 0.081 -0.008***
Net Wcapital 0.005 -0.078 0.083*** 0.024 -0.074 0.098***
Investment 0.003 0.013 -0.010* 0.000 0.008 -0.008***
Dividend 0.643 0.687 -0.044*** 1.000 1.000 0.000
RD costs 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bonds 0.271 0.482 -0.211*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm sigma 0.031 0.021 0.010*** 0.020 0.015 0.005***
Industry sigma 0.021 0.019 0.002*** 0.019 0.017 0.002***
BG Liquidity
BG cash 0.000 17.865 0.000 18.932
BG cash flow 0.000 18.141 0.000 19.428
Fin.AFF No 0.000 0.960 0.000 1.000
Fin.AFF D 0.000 0.543 0.000 1.000
BG Diversification
INDN 1.000 3.854 1.000 3.000
INDQcorr 1.000 0.729 1.000 0.695
AFFQcorr 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -0.006
AFFCFcorr 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002
Notes: This table presents the mean and median values of characteristics for chaebol firms and non-
chaebol firms during the sample period. The differences in the means between chaebol firms and
non-chaebol firms are evaluated using t-statistics and the differences in the medians are evaluated
using Z-statistics (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3.3: Baseline estimation
All Pooled BG NonBG z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size -0.001 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.855
(-0.28) (-0.00) (1.12) (0.04)
Leverage -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.078*** -0.060*** -0.735
(-4.69) (-4.67) (-4.11) (-3.92)
Tobin’s Q 0.008** 0.008** 0.002 0.008** -0.763
(2.05) (1.99) (0.25) (2.05)
Cash flow 0.049** 0.048** -0.035 0.053** -1.956
(2.07) (2.04) (-0.93) (2.12)
Net Wcapital -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.062*** -0.039*** -0.819
(-3.15) (-3.18) (-2.60) (-2.70)
Firm sigma 0.087* 0.088* 0.180 0.080* 0.794
(1.87) (1.88) (1.56) (1.66)
Industry sigma 0.353 0.351 0.424 0.361 0.136
(1.42) (1.42) (1.16) (1.23)
Investment -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.044*** -0.037** -0.380
(-3.01) (-3.10) (-4.09) (-2.39)
Dividends 0.006* 0.006* 0.004 0.009** -0.814
(1.92) (1.89) (0.73) (2.17)
RD costs -0.031 -0.018 -0.344 0.172 -1.244
(-0.12) (-0.07) (-1.22) (0.56)
Bonds -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005* -0.007*** 0.805
(-3.48) (-3.43) (-1.86) (-3.36)
BG dummy -0.014***
(-2.76)
Constant 0.108 0.087 -0.098 0.083
(1.22) (0.97) (-0.63) (0.74)
N 7180 7180 1518 5662
Adj. R2 0.502 0.503 0.514 0.494
Notes: Effects of business group affiliation on cash holdings, 1993-2006. This table reports various
regression results with firms’ cash holdings as the dependent variable. Business group affiliation
is represented using a dummy variable, BG, which is 1 if the firm is affiliated to chaebols. All
estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***),
5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3.4: Funds in Chaebol
Panel A: BG Liquidity Panel B: Financial Affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.01) (0.00) (-0.12) (-0.09)
Leverage -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061***
(-4.66) (-4.67) (-4.61) (-4.65)
Tobin’s Q 0.008** 0.008** 0.008* 0.008*
(2.01) (2.00) (1.91) (1.92)
Cash flow 0.048** 0.048** 0.047** 0.047**
(2.04) (2.04) (2.02) (2.02)
Net Wcapital -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(-3.18) (-3.18) (-3.18) (-3.19)
Firm sigma 0.088* 0.087* 0.086* 0.087*
(1.88) (1.88) (1.86) (1.87)
Industry sigma 0.350 0.350 0.361 0.356
(1.42) (1.42) (1.45) (1.44)
Investment -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(-3.11) (-3.10) (-3.01) (-3.01)
Dividends 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
(1.88) (1.88) (1.89) (1.83)
RD costs -0.019 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.03)
Bonds -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-3.44) (-3.43) (-3.43) (-3.45)
BG dummy -0.021* -0.016* -0.011** -0.010*
(-1.90) (-1.88) (-1.99) (-1.79)
BG Cash 0.000
(0.67)






Constant 0.086 0.087 0.099 0.096
(0.95) (0.96) (1.09) (1.06)
N 7180 7180 7180 7180
Adj. R-sq 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503
Notes: Effects of business group liquidity on cash holdings, 1993-2006. This table reports various
regression results with firms’ cash holdings as the dependent variable. Business group liquidity
is represented using four variables: BG Cash, BG Cash flow, Fin.AFF No, and Fin.AFF D. All
estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***),
5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3.5: Diversification in Chaebol
Panel A: Industry-level Panel B: Affiliate-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.01) (0.00) (-0.01)
Leverage -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.061***
(-4.66) (-4.65) (-4.66) (-4.67) (-4.66)
Tobin’s Q 0.008* 0.008* 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(1.96) (1.93) (1.98) (2.00) (1.98)
Cash flow 0.047** 0.048** 0.048** 0.048** 0.048**
(2.02) (2.03) (2.04) (2.04) (2.04)
Net Wcapital -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(-3.18) (-3.19) (-3.18) (-3.18) (-3.18)
Firm sigma 0.086* 0.087* 0.088* 0.088* 0.088*
(1.86) (1.88) (1.88) (1.88) (1.89)
Industry sigma 0.361 0.354 0.353 0.350 0.354
(1.45) (1.43) (1.42) (1.42) (1.43)
Investment -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031***
(-3.05) (-3.14) (-3.10) (-3.11) (-3.12)
Dividends 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
(1.89) (1.89) (1.90) (1.89) (1.90)
RD costs -0.016 -0.022 -0.015 -0.020 -0.014
(-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.06)
Bonds -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-3.49) (-3.45) (-3.42) (-3.46) (-3.45)
BG dummy -0.008 -0.005 -0.015*** -0.014** -0.014***









Constant 0.094 0.063 0.088 0.087 0.088
(1.05) (0.70) (0.98) (0.97) (0.98)
N 7180 7180 7180 7180 7180
Adj. R-sq 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503
Notes: Effects of group-wide diversification on cash holdings, 1993-2006. This table reports various
regression results with firms’ cash holdings as the dependent variable. Diversification is represented
using four measures: INDN, INDQ-corr, AFFQ-corr and AFFCF-corr. All estimations include year
fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3.6: After the Asian financial crisis I: Funds
Panel A: BG Liquidity Panel B: Financial Affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.84) (0.80) (0.76) (0.77)
Leverage -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065***
(-3.77) (-3.74) (-3.71) (-3.74)
Tobin’s Q 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.91) (0.91) (0.81) (0.84)
Cash flow 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.069** 0.070***
(2.61) (2.63) (2.58) (2.59)
Net Wcapital -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(-3.14) (-3.12) (-3.14) (-3.15)
Firm sigma 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.042
(0.58) (0.59) (0.56) (0.57)
Industry sigma -0.055 -0.048 -0.050 -0.056
(-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.20)
Investment -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(-2.95) (-3.01) (-2.85) (-2.85)
Dividends 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.82) (0.87) (0.74) (0.68)
R&D costs 0.104 0.093 0.152 0.135
(0.35) (0.31) (0.52) (0.46)
Bonds -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(-4.36) (-4.40) (-4.67) (-4.54)
BG dummy 0.004 0.000 -0.011 -0.011
(0.41) (0.02) (-1.63) (-1.61)
BG Cash -0.001**
(-2.42)






Constant -0.029 -0.024 -0.015 -0.017
(-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.09) (-0.11)
N 4182 4182 4182 4182
Adj. R-sq 0.596 0.596 0.597 0.597
Notes: Effects of business group liquidity on cash holdings, 1999-2006. This table reports various
regression results with firms’ cash holdings as the dependent variable. Business group liquidity
is represented using four variables: BG Cash, BG Cash flow, Fin.AFF No, and Fin.AFF D. All
estimations include year fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***),
5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Table 3.7: After the Asian financial crisis II: Diversification
Panel A: Industry-level Panel B: Affiliate-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.82) (0.77) (0.83) (0.81) (0.82)
Leverage -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.065***
(-3.76) (-3.70) (-3.78) (-3.75) (-3.75)
Tobin’s Q 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.86) (0.86) (0.94) (0.91) (0.92)
Cash flow 0.069** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(2.58) (2.63) (2.61) (2.59) (2.59)
Net Wcapital -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051***
(-3.15) (-3.11) (-3.12) (-3.11) (-3.11)
Firm sigma 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.045 0.045
(0.56) (0.57) (0.58) (0.60) (0.60)
Industry sigma -0.053 -0.041 -0.063 -0.051 -0.053
(-0.19) (-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.19)
Investment -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(-2.87) (-3.08) (-2.94) (-2.96) (-2.96)
Dividends 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.71) (0.76) (0.77) (0.79) (0.78)
RD costs 0.128 0.117 0.095 0.092 0.091
(0.44) (0.40) (0.32) (0.31) (0.30)
Bonds -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(-4.54) (-4.51) (-4.49) (-4.61) (-4.62)
BG dummy -0.005 -0.003 -0.016** -0.013* -0.013*









Constant -0.017 -0.076 -0.028 -0.025 -0.026
(-0.11) (-0.49) (-0.18) (-0.16) (-0.16)
N 4182 4182 4182 4182 4182
Adj. R-sq 0.597 0.598 0.596 0.596 0.596
Notes: Effects of group-wide diversification on cash holdings, 1999-2006. This table reports various
regression results with firms’ cash holdings as the dependent variable. Diversification is represented
using four measures: INDN,INDQ-corr, AFFQ-corr and AFFCF-corr. All estimations include year
fixed effects and t-statistics are in parentheses. Significant at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels.
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Figure 3.1: Average annual cash to total assets ratio of Korean listed firms
Notes: This figure displays the average ratio of cash to total assets of non-chaebol and chaebol listed
firm on Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in the sample from 1993 to 2006. I exclude firms operating
in financial and utility industries. Cash to assets is cash and marketable securities divided by
total assets. Chaebol is Korean business groups. I follow Korean Fair Trade Committee (KFTC)
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Business groups in Korea 1993-2006
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has announced business groups (chaebols) every April which are subject
to regulations and restrictions of Korean government. This table represents the list of family-owned business groups
from the annual reports of KFTC during 1993-2006. If a business group name is changed, I use the latest name in
the sample period. Recent identification and detailed information on business groups can be found on the website
(http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr).
Table A.1: Chaebols in Korea





















































































Definitions of the main variables
84
Table B.1: Definition of the variables in Chapter 2
Total Assets Total assets
Size Logarithm of total assets
Age Firm age
ROA (Profitability) Ratio of operating income to total assets
Cash Cash and short term financial instruments scaled by total assets
Cash Flow Income before depreciation scaled by total assets
Total Leverage Total debt scaled by total assets
Leverage Long-term debt and current position of long term debt scaled by
total assets
Collateral Tangible assets scaled by total assets
Investment Capital expenditure scaled by total assets
MES The median of total sales in each industry at three-digit KSIC
Exchange Exchage rate between Korean won and US dollar
BG(Chaebol) affiliation
BG 1 if a firm is affiliated to chaebol
BG 30 1 if a firm is affiliated to thirty largest chaebols
BG 5 1 if a firm is affiliated to five largest chaebols
BG cash Logarithm of combined cash inside chaebols minus own cash
Fin. Affiliates the number of financial intermediaries of each chaebol
Max Sales 1 if an affiliate has the highest total sales inside chaebol
Med Qnon 1 if Tobin’s Q of operating industry is above the median inside
chaebol
Asian financial crisis
Pre 1 if before the crisis (during 1992-1996)
AFC 1 if during the crisis (during 1997-1998)
Post 1 if after the crisis (during 1999-2006)
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Table B.2: Definition of the variables in Chapter 3
Total Assets Total assets
Size Logarithm of total assets
Cash Cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets
Leverage Total debt scaled by total assets
Tobin’s Q Investment opportunity
Market value of the firm (book value of asset less the book value of the
equity plus the market value of the equity), divided by book value of the
assets
Cash flow Income before depreciation scaled by total assets
Net Wcapital Working capital, less cash, divided by total assets
Investment Capital expenditure scaled by total assets
R&D Research and development spending over sales
Dividend 1 if the firms pay dividend in that year and 0 otherwise
Bonds 1 if the firms issue bonds in that year and 0 otherwise
Firm sigma a volatility of firm-level cash flow over the past three years
Industry sigma the median of Firm sigma in each industry at two-digit KSIC
BG(Chaebol) affiliation
BG 1 if a firm is affiliated to chaebol
BG Cash Logarithm of combined Cash inside the chaebol minus firm own Cash
BG Cash flow Logarithm of combined Cash Flow inside the chaebol minus firm own
Cash Flow
Fin.AFF No the number of financial intermediaries inside chaebol
Fin.AFF D 1 if a firm’s chaebols have financial intermediaries and zero otherwise
INDN the number of different two-digit operating industry inside chaebol
INDQcorr Asset-weighted Tobin’s Q correlations across industries in chaebol
AFFQcorr Difference between asset-weighted Q volatility and the Q volatility ob-
tained after accounting for the cross-affiliates Q correlations
AFFCFcorr Difference between asset-weighted CF volatility and the CF volatility
obtained after accounting for the cross-affiliates Q correlations
